THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

The review by Professor Turner of Canon Streeter's book *The Four Gospels* is of so weighty and powerful a kind that we have decided to omit the section of Miscellanea this month and publish it as a whole in one number. The wide learning and ripe judgment which the reviewer brings to the task are already well known to our readers; and the insertion of cross-headings will, we hope, serve as a guide through the labyrinthine ways of this vast subject. It is to be noted that on two of the most important and original points in the volume—the identification of Origen's text as that of the Church of Cæsarea, and the existence of a first draft of Luke compiled before Mark had come into the Evangelist's hands—Professor Turner is in general agreement with Canon Streeter. We only wish that space had permitted the Professor to give us his view on Canon Streeter's interpretation of the Papias fragment, and of his fascinating, if daring, conjecture that the last two chapters of the Fourth Gospel are our best guide as to the contents of the lost ending of Mark.

Probably few of our readers have ever heard of "Russellism"; and the article printed below shows that there is no reason why we should. Nevertheless, this strange vagary of Protestantism has still some vogue in North America, and is even being introduced among the natives of West Africa. We received a request last summer from a West Indian priest working in French Guinea asking us to publish some information on the subject, as the doctrines of "Russellism" were being propagated amongst his people by an organization in London. Dr. F. C. Grant, Editor of the *Anglican Theological Review*, kindly put us in touch with one of his associate editors, Dr. Maynard, who teaches the History of Religions in Brynmawr College, Brynmawr, Philadelphia; and we are indebted to him for this fair and searching account of a foolish and mischievous movement.

THE EASTERN CHURCHES

II.—THE ŒCUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE AND ITS POSITION

In the first of these articles I attempted, among other things, to intimate the importance of the Constantinople Patriarchate to Orthodox Christianity as a whole. The position, the rights, the kind of primacy belonging to the Phanar (it is not unusual to call the Patriarchate by the name of its local habitation on the Golden Horn) can only be intimated, as they defy definition or even minute description. But it seems no exaggeration to say that if the various patriarchates and national Churches of Orthodoxy, each of which is admittedly autocephalous, are to move together and make use of their new opportunities as a united body, by far their best chance, if we may not say their only chance, is an initiative and activity on wise and constitutional lines by the Phanar.

It is probably true that the Governments of the countries chiefly concerned could arrange a Council and send to it their leading Metropolitans and theologians. But it is precisely this which it is so desirable, if possible, to avoid. In a Council which meets at the behest of politicians and on the initiative of Governments, it is hardly to be expected that political influences will be left at the door. What statesmen create they desire to control, and it would be asking too much to hope that as soon as the Council began its sittings, those who brought it into being would stand aside and not want to shape the trend of its discussions and its final decisions.

But even if, in this particular case, the parents of the Assembly were so self-denying, it would be out of the question that a Church Council so generated would be distinguished by a special consciousness of independence and self-respect. Still more would it be absurd to expect that it would have any very high prestige in the eyes of outsiders or opponents. It is already and, by the nature of the case, certain enough that political considerations will try to be very active. But a Council which has met on the initiative of the Church acting *proprio motu*, and urged by a strong conviction that after all these centuries there is a great deal needing to be done for the efficient presentation of the Faith and Gospel of Jesus Christ, has a much better chance of preventing mundane policies from usurping the leading place than a Council convened by Governments.

Nor is this only a matter for the present moment. Great religious issues are at stake in the Near East, and that at a

moment when the Orthodox Churches are in many ways at a serious disadvantage, owing to the political upheavals of the last fifteen years. The tragedy of Russia has reduced the Russian Church for the time being to a pathetic remnant. The tragedy of Greece with its annihilation abroad and its recurring revolutions and *coups d'état* at home, has left Hellenic Orthodoxy jarred and weak, and though, like Greece itself, the Church has shown signs of a surprising vitality, it is still only a convalescent. Roumania and Jugo-Slavia are, at least for the time being, weaker and distracted politically and ecclesiastically by reason of their large new territories and the novel problems and dangers which these extensions have brought with them. And Bulgaria at two important turning-points took the wrong road, as is now admitted; and not only is her political position less secure than her friends desire, but she has also to recover her place in Orthodoxy, and though it is unthinkable that any difficulty will be made about her doing so, it has to be done.

This constitutes a real crisis, and who can doubt that just as a dignified Council of Orthodox Churches, meeting under ecclesiastical initiative solving spiritual problems on spiritual lines, and dominated neither by political influences, nor by its own extreme members, would raise Orthodox Christianity into a stronger position than it has held for centuries, so a failure now in the present condition of things must be a veritable catastrophe, involving not only to-day, but many a long day to come?

The present position of the Œcumenical Patriarchate is, then, a matter of grave importance, and unfortunately, instead of being secure, it is in very serious danger.

It is no secret at all that Turkey went to Lausanne anxious to bring the Patriarchate to an end. But learning that it would encounter a very stiff opposition to this project, the Turkish delegates did not insist; on the contrary, they gave way, and the continued existence of the Phanar was granted. But it is to be observed that this concession was not embodied in the Lausanne Treaty, which does not mention it. It was secured, if that is the right word, in another way. On June 10, 1923, Ismet Pasha, the chief delegate of Turkey, made a formal declaration of the decision of the Turkish Government to allow the Patriarchate to continue to exist, and this declaration was recorded in the official minutes of the sitting. There was therefore no need for any mention of the matter in the Treaty, as it was settled and secured before and apart from the Treaty.

But in the Convention of Lausanne for the regulation of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, there is a clause to which attention must be drawn. It exempts from

expulsion from Turkey all Greek-Orthodox members "of the population and corporations of Constantinople" who were resident in that city before October 30, 1918. From this it follows that all Greek-Orthodox who came to Constantinople after that date are liable to expulsion from Turkey under the Convention, and the Turkish Government insists that this rule shall be applied rigidly even to the Phanar. If that is enforced a number of Metropolitans, now members of the Holy Synod at the Phanar, will have to leave the country, and this will very seriously diminish the Synod, not only in numbers, but in quality and weight.

Even this, however, is not the most serious matter. There is another point which is a far graver menace. According to Turkish law only Turkish subjects are eligible to be made Metropolitans of dioceses in Turkey. But the Convention of Lausanne removes all Greek-Orthodox from the Turkish Empire, except those in Constantinople who are exempt (see above). Consequently, in future the clergy and prelates and Metropolitans, and therefore also the Holy Synod itself, must all be drawn and recruited from the Orthodox-Greek population of one city, Constantinople. And there can be only one result. It will be impossible to keep up the necessary standard. The range of those from whom the hierarchy may be drawn is altogether too small; and even if the Holy Synod can maintain its number of members, their quality cannot be high enough to enable it to fulfil its proper functions as the Synod of central and senior Church of the Orthodox world, and to command the respect of the other autocephalous Churches.

Thus, what seemed to be secured by the Lausanne declaration made by Ismet Pasha is destroyed by the interaction of the Lausanne Convention and Turkish law, and already the results are being felt. The Turkish Government has given formal notice that the recently elected Œcumenical Patriarch is a removable person under the Convention, and though they have not yet commanded him to depart, at any moment the order may be issued.

The matter in itself is not a difficult one to adjust. The desire that a member of the Holy Synod at the Phanar should be a Turkish subject is quite natural, and one cannot believe that there would be any opposition on the part of the Synod. But there is such a thing as naturalization. Also there are a fair number of Greek dioceses which are in what we should call the Province of Constantinople—*i.e.*, they are administratively under Constantinople, not under Athens, such as the Orthodox dioceses in Macedonia, Western Thrace, Epirus, Crete, and the Ægean Islands. If the Metropolitans of these places were

eligible for election to the Phanar, and on their appointment were to become Turkish subjects, the difficulty would be met. But such adjustments do not take place unless either mutual goodwill exists or the necessary pressure is brought to bear. At the present moment signs of goodwill between the Government at Angora and the Phanar are not easily discerned. Yet the last twelve months or so have not been a period of active hostility; quite the reverse. It is therefore possible that a well-supported proposal on these lines might prove acceptable at Angora. No Government can flourish permanently without the goodwill of its subjects and neighbours; it can only have a bare and precarious existence; and there is therefore reason to hope that a solution in the way here suggested, or some similar way, may be found. But time is of great importance in this matter, and the sooner it is done the better.

Failing this, another plan will suggest itself. It is to create a Synod composed of representatives of all the autocephalous Orthodox Churches, to be a kind of Œcumenical executive committee or standing council, managing all general questions that affect Orthodoxy as a whole; while the Holy Synod of Constantinople would sink back into being the local Synod of that city and its suburbs. This would, in the first place, be a hazardous experiment just where and when experiments are to be avoided if possible. And, again, it would mean the loss of a great force, for no standing committee would have history and tradition and association behind it to make it in the least degree comparable with the illustrious see on the Bosphorus. Here, I think, a parallel with the Anglican Communion may be legitimately and profitably drawn. Even with us Western people, among whom these things count for less than they do in the East, it would mean serious loss of power and cohesion if we tried to put a standing committee representing all our self-governing branches in the place of Canterbury. With such a machine to express and promote our oneness, we should become a more and more loosely knit federation till we drifted apart, or broke up under the first serious strain. So would it be in a far higher degree with Orthodox Christianity. So the united endeavour of all who believe that, given a fair chance now, Orthodoxy has an important part to play in Christendom, should be to preserve and strengthen the Œcumenical Patriarchate. And there is one recent change which ought not to be overlooked, because it tells so strongly in favour of this design. The whole series of events in the Near East during the last few years has resulted in making the Patriarchate of the Phanar of no political account at all. Not many years ago Governments, both Christian and Moslem, might look upon it as rather formidable.

With Russia still one of the "Great Powers" close at hand and eager to advance to Constantinople; with Orthodox Greeks in large numbers, wealthy and influential, too, many of them, all over the Turkish Empire, the Porte might not unreasonably be rather nervous about the Phanar. An *imperium in imperio* with powerful outside support close and not reluctant might well seem an element to be dreaded. But now all that is at an end. To no Turk can the Phanar loom large as a power. It is stripped of all but its "spiritualities," and that, from a religious point of view, should be its strength, and should enable the ancient see of St. Chrysostom to serve Orthodoxy and Christendom with singleness of aim and its hands free.

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There remains to be considered the more distinctly religious conditions and prospects of the Orthodox Churches, and, as the most important and interesting aspect of the whole matter, it should perhaps have come first. But I have held it back, believing that it would be more intelligible if it followed a description of its general setting, and the governing conditions and circumstances.

JOHN GIBRALTAR.

(To be continued.)

THE GOSPEL OF LIFE

VIII.—THE RESURRECTION AND THE LIFE

WE have followed the development of the Gospel of Life in our Lord's public teaching at Jerusalem. But, before we attempt to estimate the results of our inquiry as to the answer to the question we set before us—What was the Gospel represented by the evangelist as preached at Jerusalem?—there are two subjects on which we must go back.

The first is the connection with the Gospel of Life of our Lord's Resurrection, and the place in that Gospel of resurrection itself as the gift of life through death.

The Resurrection is the climax of the Gospel story in all the four records alike. Perhaps in all the records we have not fully appreciated how far it reinterprets the whole of the previous story.

To the evangelist, by whom or in whose person the Fourth Gospel is written, it is the climax of the history of his personal faith. "He saw and believed." The words are pregnant. The word for faith, belief, is used not merely in a *variety* of meanings. There is a succession, a *gradation* of meanings, from

the first impulse which attaches the disciple to the new teacher, from the first impulse to follow the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, up to the final faith of the empty tomb. The faith of that first attachment, the first gleam of hope that He might be the Messiah for whom they were looking, might pass through periods of doubt and depression when, like the Baptist, their souls would ask, "Art Thou he that should come?" It might flame up in the defiant utterance of St. Peter, "Lord, to whom shall we go?" Not till the end do we reach the final overwhelming of all doubts in the cry of St. Thomas, "My Lord and my God." The evangelist of the Fourth Gospel, seeing the end in the beginning, felt that first impulse of faith to be identical with all into which it had grown. This is the faith into which it had grown, "He saw and believed." Here was the revealing fact, Life from the dead.

Meanwhile, in the discourses throughout the Gospel there have been teachings which anticipated the significance of the Resurrection.

What are we to think of these apparent anticipations?

Approaching them as we do, after a long period in which our attention has been mainly concentrated on the Synoptic picture, with a prepossession which almost amounts to a prejudice, we are naturally disposed at first sight to say that the evangelist is carrying back into the earlier story his own later apprehension of the truth, rather than recording any memory of words actually spoken by our Lord. Apart from any question as to the exact words attributed to our Lord, what did the evangelist intend us to understand by these earlier references to the Resurrection? How far is it reasonable to suppose that he intended us to understand that the Gospel of Resurrection was, in the Master's own mind, part and parcel of the Gospel of Life?

Let us review the passages in question. First comes the discourse following on the healing of the Impotent man (v. 19-28). Our Lord is justifying Himself by reference to His absolute dependence on the Father. The "work" is only the beginning. There are greater things to come. "For as the Father raiseth the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son also quickeneth whom He will." The healing is an initial manifestation of the power of raising the dead. "The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live." This power is immanent in the Son. "For as the Father hath life in Himself; so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself." "The hour cometh in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that

have done ill unto the resurrection of judgment." The main implication of this record is simple enough. It is that our Lord from the first saw His miracles of healing as manifestations of the life essentially present in the Son, life which would hereafter be shown as life from the dead.

The next passage is in the discourse on the Bread of Life (vi. 26-58). The Galilean multitude are exhorted to "labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for the meat which abideth unto eternal life, which the Son of man shall give unto you." "The bread of God is that which cometh down out of heaven and giveth life unto the world." And this life is to carry with it resurrection at the last day. The will of the Father is that everyone that believeth in the Son should have Eternal Life, "and I will raise him up at the last day." The bread of life is that "which cometh down out of heaven that a man may eat thereof, and not die." "I am the living bread which came down out of heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever." It is an essential feature of the life which is in Him, of which He gives it to the believer to partake, that he shall be raised up at the last day, and shall live for ever. It is eternal life, and eternal life is life from the dead.

Again, though only in a single sentence, in the great revealing conflict at Jerusalem at the Feast of Tabernacles (viii. 51). "If a man keep My word, he shall never taste of death." In the life that He gives death will be only a negligible incident.

And, more significantly, in the discourse of the Good Shepherd (x. 17, 18), the sacrificial laying down of His life, which is the ground of the love between the Father and the Son, is a laying down His life that He may take it again. "Therefore doth the Father love Me because I lay down My life that I may take it again." Death is here the sacrifice and self-surrender of love, and in this sacrifice of life the power to take it again is as essentially His own as the power to lay it down. "No one taketh it away from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."

To these passages should be added, as indications of what was in our Lord's mind as the Gospel of Life, the words assigned to Him in the story of the raising of Lazarus (xi.), "This sickness is not unto death." Death is not its end, but life from the dead. "Our friend Lazarus is fallen asleep; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep." As sleep in the natural life, so death in the life of those that live in Him. This life lives through death.

"Thy brother shall rise again," for "I am the Resurrection and the Life. He that believeth on Me, though he die, yet shall

he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die." Those who live in Him shall live through death, for the Life which He is *is* the Resurrection.

The raising of Lazarus is not here the Divine vindication of the Messiah; it is not merely one more instance of a miracle of raising the dead, recorded as having played its part in provoking His enemies to action. It is, like all the miracles of healing, an acted parable—an acted parable here of the revelation of Life in Him who, as the Life, is also the Resurrection. The Life that is in Him, the Life that He is, is the Life that lives through death. This life which manifests itself as Resurrection He Himself is.

If we now go back from the survey of these passages in the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptic story, we seem at first sight to pass into an atmosphere in which these utterances will not be at home.

The miracles of raising the dead in the Synoptic story range simply with the other miracles of healing, more wonderful, but not noted as having any special significance.

Still, even this fact has a significance of its own. It appears that in the Synoptic story our Lord shows Himself to be the Lord of a life that conquers death; and this fact takes its place as a natural and unquestioned part of the picture of His ministry of help to man.

And when we pass the predictions of the Passion in the latter half of His ministry, there is much more to be said.

In the first place, it is to be noted that in all the three instances given as representative of a new element in His teaching, which, one would infer, must have often found expression, the prediction of His Passion is also a prediction of His Resurrection. The one exception is St. Luke's record of the prediction which follows the Transfiguration. And here St. Luke's own abbreviated story has contained the indication that His "exodus" is linked with the glory which is being foreshadowed in the Transfiguration itself.

But the record in all three evangelists of the prediction which follows on St. Peter's confession carries us further. For, as perhaps with us, so with His disciples, it was the prediction of the Passion which monopolized their attention; the prediction of the Resurrection passed unnoticed. And St. Peter hereupon takes the Master to task for entertaining this prospect of humiliation. St. Luke omits St. Peter's protest, but he records the utterance which, in St. Mark and St. Matthew, appears on the ground of His rebuke of St. Peter. In St. Mark, where this is one of the two marked occasions when our Lord "called unto Him the multitude," as though to claim that the

principle he was enunciating made its appeal direct to the instincts of the human heart, the words are: "If any man would come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Me."

The picture is amazing enough. It appeals to the familiar sight of a criminal going to crucifixion, carrying his cross. And the picture is of the Messiah thus passing to His inevitable doom, followed by a procession of His true disciples, with like humility accepting a like fate. But it is much more significant that to accept this doom was, for the disciple as for his Master, to "deny himself." And this is further interpreted in the words which follow, "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the Gospel's shall save it. For what doth it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life? For what should a man give in exchange for this life?"

Death is the only road to life. To elude the self-sacrifice to the death is to lose the life. To lose your life by self-sacrifice to the death is to save it. Life through death is the only life, a death that means the denial of the self.

What, then, is the outcome of this comparison of the anticipations or forecasts of the Resurrection in the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptic story? In the first place, it is plain that, according to the Synoptic record, our Lord not only anticipated His Passion, but that with this anticipation was linked the anticipation of His Resurrection. This in itself affects our judgment on the allusions to resurrection in the Fourth Gospel. If the Resurrection was in His mind, was it not bound to appear in His teachings on the Gospel of Life?

Secondly, the connection between the death and the resurrection in the Synoptic record is so close that we are already prepared for the further step taken in the Fourth Gospel, where it appears to be of the very essence of the life, the life given through the Son, that it lives through death.

Thirdly, the connection between death and resurrection appears in the Synoptic story as a moral principle. Death as death to self is the one supreme manifestation of life. It is the only road to life.

If we follow this principle back into the revelation of the very nature of life in the Fourth Gospel, Life, as the living communion with the Father,* reproducing in us the self-

* *Cf.* Luke xx. 38: "He is not the God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto Him." The assurance that the dead are raised lies in their communion with their God, the living God. Even the resurrection of judgment (John v. 28) will be the resurrection of those who have been in however imperfect a spiritual contact with God, and their judgment will be the issue and necessary consequence of their failure to accept the life which has been put within their reach.

abnegating life of the Son in His relation to the Father, is, in those who accept the life of the Son as their life, the self-denial, the self-sacrifice, the death to self, which is the very means through which life manifests itself as resurrection. This is a truth foreshadowed in the life of nature in the grain of wheat which is not quickened except it die, but in whose life it is an essential stage that it *does* die, and *is* quickened, a truth fully revealed in Him in whom the power to lay down His life was also the power to take it again.

The Resurrection, therefore, was not a miracle that gave an external proof of the claim to give life; it was the revealing experience of the essential character of life itself.

Thus the solution of our initial doubt as to the possibility of these anticipations of the Resurrection in the course of our Lord's teaching of the Gospel of Life lies in the answer to these questions:

Was it not an essential part of the Gospel of Life that the life was a life that lived through death ?

Would the revelation of the Gospel of Life have been complete if this character of the life had been omitted ?

Our Lord had the Resurrection in mind. Are we to suppose that He did not see its vital significance ? Or that, seeing it, He did not proclaim it ?

And the answer suggested is that, apart from any question as to the actual words attributed to Him in the Fourth Gospel, there must have been utterances of our Lord, not understood at the time, not recorded by those by whom they were not understood, but recalled when they came to be understood, and recalled just because they came to be understood, by one who, whoever he was, entered into the deeper meaning of the gift of Eternal Life, as the life that lives through death.

IX.—THE SPIRIT AND THE LIFE

We have considered the question of the relation of the Resurrection to the Gospel of Life as preached to the Jews of Jerusalem. It remains to consider what is the relation to that Gospel of the gift of the Spirit.

The real answer to this question will be found when we come to consider what was the relation of the gift of the Spirit to the Gospel of Life as further preached to the disciples in the discourses recorded in chaps. xiv.-xvii., and as represented in the first Epistle of St. John.

The actual place of the doctrine of the Spirit in the Gospel as preached to Jerusalem may be shown by a review of the

three passages (in chaps. iii., iv., and vi.) in which our Lord is recorded to have mentioned the Spirit:

I. As to the first, in the discourse to Nicodemus in chap. iii., three things are to be noted:

1. First we should note that the new birth is declared not in a public discourse addressed to the Jews of Jerusalem, but in a private discourse to an individual representative of the Jews of Jerusalem, who showed signs of being in advance of the body to which he belonged in his desire to attain a fuller knowledge of our Lord's teaching.

2. Secondly, we should observe that the stress is on the nature of the gift, a spiritual new birth, rather than on the agency by which it is to be given.

3. But, thirdly, it is important to observe that the metaphor of the wind suggests that the new birth will be a gift from without, not merely the awakening of a latent power in man who receives it. The passage recalls the words used in the record of the vision of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 9), " Come from the four winds, O breath." It is as though our Lord, as He said, " Behold the birds of the heaven," " Consider the lilies of the field," so here said, " Listen to the wind."

The creative breath of God which moved upon the face of the waters, the life-giving breath of God which was to breathe upon the dead that they might live, was to enter into the soul, to begin in it a new life.

II. The second passage is in the talk with the woman of Samaria on the true worship in chap. iv.

1. Here, again, we should note first that our Lord was not dealing with one who was an example of the Jewish temper of self-satisfied self-sufficiency. The Samaritans, and the woman in particular, were open to the reception of a gift. The fields were white already to harvest.

2. Secondly, we may note that the mention of the Spirit is associated with the knowledge of God. There is to be a new worship, neither Jewish nor Samaritan; it is to be a worship in spirit, as God is a Spirit, or is Spirit, and this means a worship in truth. As Jewish worship was inspired by a real knowledge of God which the Samaritan did not share, so the new worship will transcend the Jewish worship in the real knowledge of God. It is the worship inspired by this real knowledge of God as He is which is described as worship in spirit.

III. The third passage is at the conclusion of the discourse on the Bread of Life (vi. 63), " It is the Spirit that quickeneth." The point which concerns our present question may be dealt with without reference to the meaning of the *ῥήματα*, of which

He says that they are spirit and are life. If they are "things," they are things that give life; if they are words, they are words that describe the gift of life through certain means. In either case, what our Lord is saying is that the life-giving principle is the Spirit.

1. Here we may notice first that the hearers are mixed. Those immediately addressed are (*a*) doubting disciples, disturbed by the answer He had given to (*b*) objecting Jews, who, in their turn, had been offended by teaching given (*c*) to Galileans.

2. It is worthy of note, in reference to the subject of the last section, that the word for "quickening," ζωοποιεῖν, is used in eight of the ten passages in which it occurs in the New Testament of raising from the dead.

It is sufficiently plain that, though there is nothing in these passages which does not harmonize with, and gain a fuller meaning from, what is to come, we have nowhere here an anticipation of the doctrine of the Spirit as we find it in chaps. xiv.-xvii., or in the Epistle.

If we now ask *why* the Spirit is not more often or more explicitly mentioned in the preaching at Jerusalem, there is a passage in chap. vii. which suggests the answer. It is where the Evangelist says, in comment on our Lord's offer of the living water, "This spake He of the Spirit which they which believed on Him were to receive."

There is a parallel to the question as to the absence of the doctrine of the Spirit in the earlier discourses—viz., the problem presented by the Synoptic Gospels in contrast with the Epistles. In the Epistles the Christianity presented is primarily life in the Spirit.* In the Synoptic Gospels there are only three instances in our Lord's teaching in which there is any reference to the Spirit. The explanation of both problems is suggested by this comment of the Evangelist on the living water. He regards an explicit reference to the gift of the Spirit as impossible at this stage. It will only become possible when He is speaking to those who had been prepared to receive it, and for whom the gift was already imminent. It only became possible for those who desired the life which the Spirit when He came would give. The relation of the Spirit to the gift of life is not given till the last discourses in chaps. xiv.-xvii. The passage (vii. 39) which we have just considered supplies the general reason why this is so. It was not till the disciples were prepared to receive the gift, and till the gift was imminent, that the teaching could be given or understood. Our Lord's imminent departure from those who had been with Him from the begin-

* This contrast is drawn out in the Preface to the writer's *Creed in the Epistles*, pp. vii-x of Preface.

ning prepared them to receive it. When He was "glorified" they entered upon the experience which explained it. This consideration has a bearing on one of the difficulties in the exposition of these later discourses as an announcement of the gift of the Spirit. He is throughout giving an anticipatory description of a life which experience only will enable them to understand.

In the later discourses (chaps. xiv.-xvii.) the life to be given is explicitly defined. The opening words of the great prayer in chap. xvii. tell us that Eternal Life is the knowledge of God. Knowledge to a Jew* is never mere intellectual or doctrinal knowledge. It is the knowledge of spiritual intercourse between the soul and God, who reveals Himself and impresses Himself upon the soul in a spiritual experience, fashioning and governing His life.

Our Lord turns to account the desolation which the disciples felt at the prospect of their coming separation to evoke and call into activity an intense desire for the continuance of His presence as their life in the time to come. And He meets this desire with the promise of the gift of the Spirit.

But the promise of the gift comes side by side with an insistence on the moral qualification for receiving it. They are to "keep" His commandments—*i.e.*, to hold by them and to maintain the desire and the purpose to live in them and to fulfil them. Then by receiving the Spirit they will be enabled actually to fulfil them. The source and spring of this new capacity appears in the picture of the living communion between them on the one side, and Himself and the Father on the other. The picture of this communion is set side by side with the promise of the Spirit.

It is characteristic of the mind of the Fourth Gospel, whether of the writer, or of our Lord as he represents Him, thus to co-ordinate or set side by side facts or experiences or principles which are, in the mind of the speaker or the writer, causally or rationally connected. As we read, the impression undoubtedly conveyed to our mind is that the new relation between the believer and the Father and the Son will be the result of the gift of the Spirit.

The communion between the believer and the Father and the Son is the communion of the Divine indwelling. "I will not leave you desolate, I will come unto you." "In that day ye shall know that I am in My Father, and ye in Me, and I in you." "If a man love Me he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him."

When the discourse is resumed after they have left the upper room, they learn, under the figure of the vine and the branches,

* See Sir George Adam Smith, *Book of the XII.*, p. 322.

how the fulfilment of the commandments will follow. He will dwell in them and they in Him, and so they will love one another as He has loved them. So, too, they will be enabled to carry on His conflict with the world, which will hate them as it hated him; they will be enabled to bear witness to Him; it will be the witness of the Spirit which their experience of fellowship with Him has qualified them to give.

And, as they would be feeling how greatly they needed the continuance of His present teaching, He tells them that the many things which He has yet to teach them they will learn from the Spirit, who will guide them into all the truth.

This living communion with God in Christ, which will be the gift of the Spirit, is further described in actual operation in the Epistle.

We may, perhaps, best set forth the teaching of the Epistle as illustrative of the fuller revelation of the life in the Christian experience, if we conceive the writer to have been moved in spirit by observing in the members of the Christian body, with whom he was in contact, (1) the working of the spirit of hatred and ill will, (2) the absence of compassion for those in need. His whole soul shrank from this temper. He contemplated it as *sin*, the violation of the Christian law of life, which is κοινωνία, fellowship or communion with God, a κοινωνία which demanded the banishing of sin from the soul. The three things, the keeping of the commandment of love, the mutual indwelling of God and man, and the Spirit given to us are regarded as one. "He that keepeth His commandments abideth in Him and He in him, and hereby we know that He abideth in us by the Spirit which He gave us."

This description of the issue of the life of communion with God is carried to a climax in iv. 7-21.

Here the foundation truth is that God is Love, love manifested in the sending of the Son to be the propitiation for our sins, love towards us, for if we love one another, it is because the love which God is dwells in us and is perfected in us. And we know that He dwells in us because He has given us His Spirit, which enables us to show to one another His indwelling love.

This, the Divine indwelling of the Eternal Love, is the life —eternal life, for it is the life of the Eternal in us—which it was in our Lord's heart to preach at Jerusalem, towards the preaching of which He advanced only so far as the spiritual condition of His hearers enabled Him to advance. It could only be fully revealed to believers when they came to live in the life which He foretold to His disciples at the end.

WILFRID RICHMOND.

DE RERUM NATURA (1925)

III

"If a man were to enquire of Nature—'Wherefore dost thou bring forth creatures?'—and she were willing to answer, she would say, 'Ask me not, but understand in silence, even as I am silent.'"—PLOTINUS.

WE have seen the stage, vast in space, upon which, after an unimaginably long time, life appeared. Of the origin of life upon the earth science can tell us nothing, partly because there is no known evidence that living organisms arise, or have ever arisen, from non-living matter, but more generally because science is always baffled by anything so unique as a beginning. It was suggested by Kelvin that the simplest forms of life arrived on this planet on meteors or dust, having travelled through cosmic space from some other planet. It seems impossible to prove that this could not have happened; doubtless the temperature of interplanetary space is very low, but some living organisms can withstand extreme cold. But it only removes the problem of the origin of life a stage further back, and there is no evidence that justifies us in believing in the probability of life anywhere else in the universe but on this planet. For all we know, life, physical and mental, may be, so far as the physical universe is concerned, a unique phenomenon, peculiar to this planet. The physical universe came into being through a hundred million million years, and then life appeared on one tiny speck of a planet in one corner of it. To one man this will make it almost certain that life is an "accident." It might so easily have not been at all, seeing that it only occurred in one place. It seems absurd to argue that the universe, practically infinite in time and space, came into being in order that life might appear at one point in it. To another man, on the contrary, the very uniqueness and peculiarity of life make teleology more probable. If, everywhere, matter had come to be accompanied by, and used by, life, it would seem as if the latter were the natural and inevitable result of the former. As it is, there seem greater place and opportunity, as there seems greater need, for purpose and choice.

As natural science can give no description of the beginning of life on this planet, so it cannot describe or explain what life is in itself. The most it can attempt is a general description of what living organisms do. A living creature is distinguished from a machine by certain characteristics which together make up its "behaviour." It is not simply pushed or pulled by forces acting on it from without, it can move spontaneously, and it can persist in such spontaneous movements after the

immediate external occasion for them has ceased to operate. Its movements are not predictable in detail, it can vary them " at will," and its movements come to an end so soon as they have achieved the situation at which they aim; for the thoroughgoing determinist has to admit that everything goes on in the organic world *as if* living things strive actively towards ends. It also seems to be the case that an animal learns from experience, and that its behaviour becomes more efficient as a result. We can sum up by saying that a living creature has an active power of self-maintenance as against its environment; it has a relative permanence of form, but takes nourishment, grows, and reproduces itself; its activity is complex and apparently purposive. In practice we call an object " living " if its activity more or less closely resembles our own; we assume that it has an " individuality " like our own.

Much of the most fruitful work in biology has been the result of the assumption that there is no " vital force " or similar entity characteristic of, and peculiar to, the world of life, and that we can explain all the phenomena of living matter by means of no other categories than those with which chemistry and physics describe the inorganic world. Scientists have been satisfied that the explanations of the changes in form and structure, in composition, colour, size, and shape, of living matter were due to chemical changes, and the action of physical forces, which may be more complicated than, but are of the same type as, those which take place in non-living matter. The late J. Loeb demonstrated that the apparent " behaviour " of some of the lower animals, their reaction to light, for example, was the direct result of chemical changes in the living matter of their bodies caused by the light, and he hoped to be able to demonstrate that the instinctive (and ultimately all the apparently purposive) behaviour of the higher animals and man could be explained as the product of such " tropisms," as they are called. This is still a field of controversy, but the majority of biologists and psychologists seem to be coming to the conclusion that only the very simplest movements of living creatures can be adequately explained as tropisms.

The chemical and physical changes which take place in a living organism have certain peculiarities which differentiate them from inorganic changes. The modern science of biochemistry is a different science from the ordinary chemistry of inorganic and organic compounds, and the quite remarkable changes which are at present taking place in the concepts and methods of chemistry are in no small degree due to the attempt to comprehend within its sphere the phenomena of life. So far as Physics is concerned, the difference due to the presence

of life is more definite. A steam-engine and the body of a warm-blooded animal may both be looked upon as devices for the transformation of energy. A steam-engine is fed with coal. The oxidization of the coal ("burning," it is usually called) sets free its potential chemical energy in the form of heat. This heat produces an expansion of the steam in the high-pressure cylinder, which forces forward the piston. As a result of this wheels turn round, and work is done. The potential energy of the coal is turned into mechanical work. But in the process a great deal of the energy is wasted by radiation from the various parts of the machine and from friction. Only a very small proportion of the energy of the coal is available for useful work. In the case of the warm-blooded animal, however, the differences are as important as the resemblances. The oxidization of its food produces the energy required to maintain its bodily heat and the mechanical work used in bodily movements and the motion of the heart, lungs, and blood. But the chemical changes take place without the production of anything like the same amount of heat, proportionately, as in the case of the steam-engine. The machine can only change potential energy into mechanical work by changing it first into heat, and much is lost in the process. The animal changes energy directly into work, and loses or wastes very little.

The transformations of energy in a steam-engine are, in general, irreversible; they result in a diminution of available energy. But in the economy of life changes take place in the opposite direction. In the green leaves of plants, for example, the energy of sunlight, which is ordinarily wasted, is used to transform carbon dioxide and water, substances of relatively low potential energy, into starch, and indirectly into sugar and proteins, all of which are of much higher potential energy. This is used for the supply of energy necessary for animal life, and also, in wood and coal, for heat required for the practical purposes of human life. Although it is true, therefore, that life is not a "force" or energy, and does not bring any additional or different kinds of energy into play, processes certainly take place in living matter which cannot be paralleled in the absence of life.

The inadequacy of physics and chemistry to describe the phenomena of life can be made even more plain. Any action of a living body, as, for example, a man lifting his arm, can, theoretically, be described from either of two points of view. It can be described in mechanical terms as the result of a very complicated series of stresses and strains, due to the interaction of muscles, bones, and so on. If we go further, and ask how

these forces originate, we are involved in the chemistry of the living cells. The further we go, the more complicated—impossibly complicated, one may say—does the description become, so that it becomes very difficult to give a complete account of the simplest living action in such terms. On the other hand, from the biological point of view (as for the consciousness of the active agent himself) the action is a simple unity, and all that is required for complete description of it is to relate it to the general purposes and activities of the whole organism. All that is most characteristic in living behaviour, in other words, is lost in the process of analysis, which is all that physics and chemistry can offer by way of description. It is, indeed, not too much to say that many of the concepts which are most important in modern biology, adaptation, harmony of action, development, heredity, evolution, have no meaning if our description of life is restricted to the physico-chemical level. They imply function and purpose, and the unified life of the organism which can only be described in such terms.

The importance of this discussion is surely obvious. If physics and chemistry are adequate for the description of life and its phenomena, we are inevitably shut up to materialism and determinism, and not only religion, but all the other spiritual values of man's life are futile dreams. A functional biology, however, if it be proved necessary, means the kind of relativity which makes each science autonomous within its own sphere, and allows the contribution of each, from mathematics to history and ethics, to hold its own place in the complete statement of truth. But a biology which recognizes what physics and chemistry cannot describe also implies the reality of consciousness, and its effect on the living organism, in the higher forms of life and probably in some rudimentary form in the lowest. That mind has direct and real influence on outward events is an axiom of " common-sense " thinking. It is a great difficulty for natural science, for it implies that the " Conservation of Energy " is not valid for the organic world. Unless it be true, however, the evolutionists will find it difficult to explain the survival of mind at all, for if its presence makes no difference to outward events, it is not easy to understand what its " survival value " can mean. But unless we can continue to affirm the real effect of man's mind in the world of nature, through his outward actions, we shall find it very difficult to provide any philosophical justification for any theism worthy of the name, not to speak of the Incarnation and the Miracles and Sacraments which are of the very texture of transcendental Catholicism.

Evolution, one of the fundamental assumptions of modern

biology, and, indeed, of all nineteenth-century thought, was suggested as a possibility by more than one Greek thinker of pre-Christian times, and is a natural element in the world-view of Goethe and other early Romanticists. It postulates the fundamental unity of all life; the present state of things is assumed to be the result of a state that was not quite so complex, this in its turn is derived from a condition yet more simple, and so on until, theoretically, we arrive at the original ancestors of all living creatures, simple single-celled organisms.* The contribution of Charles Darwin, at the end of the fifties of last century, was to provide this fascinating ancient speculation with a sure foundation in observed fact. He showed by experiment, backed up by an almost incredibly large amount of observation in the spheres of many different sciences (Embryology, Botany, Zoology, Comparative Psychology, and Geology), that the transmutation of species does actually take place, and he provided a description of a possible method of Evolution in his theory of Natural Selection, illustrating the way it works by a most attractive variety of examples. "The Struggle for Existence" and "The Survival of the Fittest" are, of course, merely synonyms for Natural Selection. The theory is that each individual organism is born with certain deviations from the average stock. Those which give him an advantage over his fellows, in the struggle to live in the particular environment in which he finds himself, will lead to his survival in preference to those who do not possess these advantages, and he, and not they, will tend to leave descendants. Nature acts as a kind of sieve, by which advantageous variations tend to be preserved and accumulated, and the useless or disadvantageous are eliminated. So the wonderful variety of life has arisen. And there is no doubt that at first sight this theory seems to make any assumption of purpose, whether conscious or unconscious, in the universe an unnecessary luxury. What appeared to an earlier generation to be examples of a wonderful adaptation of an organism to its environment seem to the Darwinian to be the result of a ruthless destruction of all the other "chance" variations which did not happen to fit the environment.

But the Darwinian threat to Christian theology was more serious even than this would imply. If man, with his conscience and reason and hunger for the Eternal, has been produced by "Natural Selection" (spread over millions of years, and with no single trace of purpose in it) from an infinitesimal blob of protoplasm, is it not probable that it is only conceit (useful in the

* Similarly, "the evolution of the universe" means that all things have developed from an "undifferentiated homogeneity" to an increasingly "differentiated heterogeneity."

struggle for life, of course !) which makes us think that there is more value and meaning in the end of the process than in the beginning ? Does not the " survival of the fittest " mean that nature is on the side of the strong, and opposed to the weak ? To live according to nature, which in every century since the beginning of European thought has been the counsel of the philosopher, is seen at last to mean backing up the strong because it is strong, and treading on the weak because it is weak. Success is the only ethical standard. And if the great instrument of all progress is the struggle for life, then not only does the universe put the seal of its approval on violence and selfishness, but we are compelled to assume that whatever God there is is expressed in this great law of existence. It does not seem easy to reconcile with this naturalistic interpretation of things the belief that God is Love and that Love is the law of His Kingdom.

These developments of Darwinism gain much of their plausibility, however, from confusion of thought and, in particular, from a too literal use of highly metaphorical phrases. " The survival of the fittest," for example, has, for biology, no trace of any ethical or qualitative content. What survives may be better or worse, more beautiful or more ugly, more lovable or more hateful than what is eliminated. Such considerations are not covered by the phrase at all. It means this, and nothing more than this, that in any particular environment that will tend to survive which, in that environment, is fittest to survive, or that which is best adjusted to that environment. The " fittest " to survive in the University of Oxford will probably not be the " fittest " to survive in a village of Padua. Similarly, " the struggle for life " is a phrase which has been given a more positive meaning than it ought to bear. It means no more than that, as the earth is not infinitely large and infinitely productive, those organisms will survive and propagate themselves which are quicker to accommodate themselves to, and to appropriate and use, their environment. At the lowest levels of life it is a simple cell which is the subject of selection. At a higher stage, a multicellular body, acting as a unity, survives or is eliminated, and this means that variations in cells or tissues or organs, if they are not directly disadvantageous, get a chance to survive, although they may not be immediately useful, and later may form part of a more important variation which proves of advantage at a higher stage of development. At a higher stage still not the individual, but the herd or group becomes the unit upon which Natural Selection plays, and a wonderful variety of individuals becomes possible within the group, giving rise to differentiation of function and, at times,

allowing developments to take place which are of no "survival value" to the individual, but are of great advantage to the community. The "struggle for life," then, ceases to be primarily a selfish thing; through it altruism has evolved, and all the higher rational and moral attributes of the spirit of man.

Natural Selection, as a description of the method of organic evolution, is entirely negative. It aims at showing the way in which certain "variations" are eliminated and others are preserved. Darwin was compelled to accept the fact of variation without any further explanation or description of it, for "chance," of course, is never, for the scientist, any more than a name for our ignorance. The successors of Darwin have tried to tackle the problem, with some measure of success. Mendel, De Vries, and Bateson have thrown light on the question, but there is still a good deal of "encircling gloom." It seems probable, now, that in addition to minute, apparently haphazard, variations in all direction, there are more important variations of considerable magnitude, and that these tend to become cumulative; each one, it is probable, will be in the same direction as its predecessors. However this may be, the fact remains that the power of variation, and not natural selection, is the positive element in evolution. Ever more perfect adjustments to an ever-widening and richer environment are produced, and the onus of proof is on those who deny, not on those who assert, that the valuable and intelligible products of evolution demand a teleological interpretation of the whole process.

Certainly, the development from amœba to man cannot be explained as a result of what was present at the beginning. At various points in the process, although science can never detect or describe, still less explain, an absolute beginning, new things emerge, which depend on and use what existed before, but cannot be explained in terms of it. Life, consciousness, self-consciousness, conscience, seem to be a succession of that kind. We cannot say, in any intelligible sense of the words, that life produces self-consciousness, or that consciousness produces conscience. The mind is not satisfied, that is to say, with such a series, unless it is a teleological series, unless conscience is the explanation of the whole process. The fundamental question for any philosophy of evolution is this, Does anything really new emerge in the process, or is development nothing more than a rearrangement of elements, all of which were present at the beginning? If we look at the actual story of the Descent of Man, common sense can do nothing but decide for the former alternative. There is much more in the end of the process than there was in the beginning. That the movement upwards took place in an almost infinite number of small steps is really

irrelevant. The emergence of living out of non-living, of conscious out of what was unconscious, of what is self-conscious out of what was not conscious of self, of what can recognize the moral law out of what is not free—these are a proof that mathematical determinism cannot describe evolution, but only purpose, freedom, teleology. A growth is explained by its later stages, not by its earlier, as a tree is known by its fruits, not by its roots. The meaning of a process of development has no logical connection with its origin. Many writers on the evolution of moral and religious ideas forget this elementary fact.

It seems probable that man as a whole, and not merely the physical part of him, is a product of evolution. Some kind of rudimentary consciousness seems to be implied in the behaviour of the lowest living organisms, and we can trace the development of instinct and intelligence and consciousness without any obvious break, from the lowest forms to the highest. Man shares the instincts of the animals. So far as we can judge, intelligence seems to be related to instinct in the higher mammals in much the same way as in man. The beginnings of conscience seem to appear in dogs, and the roots of altruism can be seen in monkeys and the higher apes. Animals show grief, although it seems probable that laughter is practically peculiar to man. Considerable success has attended the attempts to show how man's sense of right and wrong has been developed through the activities of the parental instinct and the herd instinct, but it is safe to say that the identification of conscience with instinct only seems a plausible explanation of the former if we either assume the existence of what we are trying to explain, or else empty the word "conscience" of what is most characteristic in its meaning. In the same way much interesting work has been done on the evolution of religious ideas (theology), and it seems to be proved that in this process the herd instinct, along with the sublimation of the sex instinct, and even of the more selfish instincts, has played a constant and intimate part. But all attempts to describe the beginnings of religion, without assuming that working of God's initiative which we call revelation, either imply the presence of that which is to be explained, or fail because they leave out what, for religious people, is most precious in their religion. All attempts to explain the higher in terms of the lower are doomed to fail in the same way. Either the lower is assumed to be as high as the higher to begin with, or the higher is treated as no higher than the lower in the end.

The attempt to explain mind and conscience and man's sense of God and beauty and truth by some principle analogous to Natural Selection is very interesting, however, from another

point of view. It means that naturalism is trying to show that these things have survived and have grown because they have "survival value," because they are useful to the human race, or to some branch of it, in the struggle for existence. But this must mean, if it be true, that our thoughts and ideals, consciousness and conscience, prayers and hopes, are causes which produce effects in the external world. It is all an unconscious denial of determinism. On the other hand, however, a thorough-going evolutionism, attempting to describe the process of growth in terms of natural selection, has to acknowledge products of the process whose survival value, to the individual or to the group, is very problematical. The power to appreciate the beauty of a landscape or a sunset, the mathematical insight that can demonstrate the General Theory of Relativity, the disinterested intellect that can say—

> "It fortifies my soul to know
> That, though I perish, truth is so"—

the hermit's sacrifice of society and all else for God's sake—it is only by giving a very far-fetched meaning to "Natural Selection" that we can explain such things by its help. The goal of the struggle for existence is that which has a value different from the mere survival of mankind, or of any individual in it. That would be an intolerable paradox if it did not remind us that biological theories like that of Natural Selection or the various theories of heredity are, like the theories of the structure of the above, not *explanations*, but only descriptive schemes imposed upon the facts by man's endeavour to arrange them.

IV

It is not easy for the scientist, whose imagination has been fed on such temporal and spatial immensities, to take the Catholic Faith seriously. It has become a *cliché* with him that thought, to be adequate to the realities of the universe, can no longer be anthropocentric, nor even geocentric. There must be a Copernican revolution in our philosophy, and it is absurd to go on pretending that man can be the measure of all things. The Catholic Church appears provincial and *démodé* with its assumption that man and his salvation can be of primary importance in the universe as we know it. Let us try now to see how Catholicism appears to the scientist, when he turns from his telescope and microscope to read a book on theology.

The universe is so vast that it may take light 950,000 years, travelling at a rate of 186,000 miles per second, to travel to us from the Andromeda nebula. Our sun is not by any means the

largest of the stars, nor can its position be fairly described except as a rather insignificant corner of the universe. The earth is one of the smaller satellites of the sun. There has been life on the earth for less than 100 million years probably (one-millionth of the age of the universe). About 25,000 years ago a creature first appeared who could fairly be called man, in the modern sense of the word. We are asked to believe that about 2,000 years ago (merely a few minutes ago, compared with the times of geology and astronomy) there began on the earth the Holy Catholic Church, a society which at no time in its history has included the majority of the living members of the human race; that the members of this society are in some favoured sense the "children" of the God who created and sustained the whole universe; that they possess a final and exclusive revelation of the truth; that they feed on Him and are His Body. Such claims do not seem, to the natural scientist, too stupendous to be believed; they seem too absurd to be considered.

And yet, if the claims were true, this exclusiveness and favouritism, as they might seem, would only fit in with the method on which the universe seems to exist. It is true that the universe is vast; that the earth is a third-rate planet attached to an insignificant star. It seems absurd to say it, but it is also true that there is no evidence at all to justify us in believing that life has appeared anywhere in the vastness of space except on this earth. Of the bodies which are near enough for detailed observation, we *know* that life as we know it must be impossible on most of them. It seems absurd to say it, but it is true that in the vast range of temperatures which is possible in the universe, all the evidence that we have seems to prove that anything that can be called self-conscious spiritual life only exists in connection with small weak physical organisms which live only between 96° and 106° F. Think of all the vast wastes of the universe where, so far as we know, creatures like man not only do not, but cannot, exist. Think of the unimaginable ages before man began to be. In the light of such thoughts it will not seem absurd that God has picked out some men to be the special vehicles of His revelation to all men. A particular revelation and a visible Church fit naturally into the universe as science has shown it to us.

The discoveries of geology and astronomy ought to have enlarged our thoughts of God. As we read the story, culminating (as who shall say that it does not ?) in man with his reason and conscience as the climax and goal of the whole development and, within the life of man, the God-indwelt life of the Holy Catholic Church as the prophecy and earnest of what human

life is yet to be, we see that God, if there be a God, must be more than a merely omnipresent process. He chooses some places, some times, to do what He wills to do, to fulfil His purpose. In other words, God is personal, acting where He chooses to act. And the more vividly this thought presents itself to our imagination, and the more clearly we grasp the fact that natural laws are the methods by which events usually happen, the more natural and fitting it will seem that particular acts of God appear recognizably within the warp and woof of nature. Miracles, then, as we have seen, mark the occasions when, for sufficient reasons, He acts in an unusual way. And sacraments, "particular providences" in the life of each Christian, show us God active at particular times and particular places; they are evidences, if they are anything more than empty and arbitrary symbols, of an intensely personal God, free to take the initiative to redeem His own world by transforming the natural into the supernatural. This thought of God as personal is greater, not smaller, than the thought of Him as process; and the emergence of personality in the process of evolution implies, surely, that unless the whole process is entirely irrational, the ground of the whole must be at least personal.

This brings us to that element of Catholicism which seems most incongruous to the ordinary mind trained in naturalism, which, nevertheless, fits most naturally into the view of nature which is wide and deep enough to include all the implications of the great generalizations of modern astronomy and geology and biology, and also, if it be true, guarantees, as it has been the origin of, the whole system of Catholic life and belief. The offence of the Gospel in these days is the Incarnation. But just as certainly as Newtonism, with its emphasis on astronomy, seemed to empty human history of its significance, so Darwinism, and those who came after Darwin, have restored man to the centre of the picture. Without doubt, man is the goal of evolution, up to the present. We are shut up to one of two alternatives. Either we have no hint of the meaning of the universe, or that meaning is—Man. And it is at least not unnatural that the intensely Personal God, whose purpose is progressively embodied in creation, should finally reveal Himself by becoming incarnate in Man. Here the consciousness of ceaseless change and flux which sicklies all modern thought over with an unsatisfying relativity reaches an Absolute. Here is a claim which challenges our prejudices. If Jesus be God, then the Power behind this vast universe is close and tender and loving, it is worth while to call Him "Father," and the light of heaven transfigures the whole story of nature. For we begin to see that it all means love and freedom; God is Love, and

man is free. That is what evolution must mean, in the light of the Incarnation: the infinite patience of God. And the root of that patience is love, as its fruit is freedom.

This, then, is the picture of the universe as we have seen it, a picture true to the truth of science, true also to the truth of religion. The laws of science are true for the purposes of the particular science which formulates each one. They are *methodological*, descriptions rather of how it is most convenient for science to describe the world, rather than explanations of what the world really is. Determinism is an improved deduction from the false assumption of the complete rationality of the universe. The concrete particular experience of each individual, from which all science is inevitably an abstraction, is made up of love and freedom, freedom the most central and fundamental reality of the universe, and the love of God who is infinitely near and personal and abidingly real. And the proof and guarantee and crown of it all, the key of nature and the root of the Catholic religion, is the Incarnation of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

ALBERT EDWARD BAKER.

RUSSELLISM

RUSSELLISM, or Dawnism, is one of the many American sects speculating on Biblical eschatology. Its founder was Charles Taze Russell, born in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1852. Russell received a common elementary education, which he tried to supplement by reading a few books, not always remarkably well chosen. He opened a haberdasher shop in his native city, and by his remarkable business ability, of which more will be said further, he became the owner of a chain of five stores. He "joined" the Congregational Church, and was looked upon as a "Christian worker." He never was ordained, although he took later the title of "Pastor." He married in 1879, and lived with his wife for seventeen years. The only kind of religious teaching which he knew was of the type which is now called "fundamentalism," which was then, as to-day, closely connected with speculation on the millennium and the date of the return of Christ. Fundamentalism has a very clear doctrine of hell which Russell did not like at all. There is in America a well-known Universalist movement which was then sufficiently orthodox in other ways to be known at least vaguely by Christians who, like Russell, lived in conservative circles. With

the Universalists, Russell protested against a doctrine of everlasting punishment which condemned the greatest part of mankind to hell. Thus he evolved a system of popular theology which he made his own and set forth at first under the title of *Millennial Dawn*. Later he changed the title of this work to *Studies in the Scriptures*.* These and other publications were circulated by certain societies entirely controlled by Russell. They were the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, the People's Pulpit Association, the International Bible Students' Association. The latter is the name under which the meetings of Russellites are officially advertised. I was told at Russellite headquarters that two million copies of Russell's works were printed last year. The circulation of the journal, *The Watch Tower*, is 50,000. It would be read by about 120,000 people.

An immense amount of money has been spent by Russell in publishing short sermons as advertisements in 2,000 newspapers, including the greatest American dailies. A photo-play entitled "The Drama of Creation" was extensively advertised throughout the country, and shown without admission fee.

The world war was a providential advertising medium. Russell had predicted the end of Christendom for 1914. It is true that he had said that the last conflict would be social and not a real war, but the prophecy was close enough for uncritical minds. Indeed, since Russell died, in 1916, his books have been reprinted without change by his disciples, although his calculations and predictions have now been shown by the events to be all wrong.

There are no statistics of the adherents to the movement. I was told by a leading Russellite that 80,000 persons partook of the last annual "Memorial" or celebration of the Lord's Supper in Russellite meeting-places in America.

The literature of Russellism is exceedingly bulky. It includes the seven volumes of *Studies in the Scriptures* and the files of Russellite periodicals, all of these rather dull. Far more interesting are the files of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, the leading paper of Brooklyn, which were kindly placed at my disposal. A number of articles dealing with Russellism were reprinted in a special issue of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, which is unhappily out of print.†

In America Russellism has not made much headway. Millions of people have seen the "Drama of Creation," and bought Russell's books. But those who happened to be interested in the eschatological aspect of Christianity were usually in touch with other adventist and millennialist organi-

* We quote these as SE, adding Volume and page.
† We quote the *Brooklyn Eagle* as BE.

zations. Between these and Russellism there is no love lost. A heated controversy has led to the writing of many pamphlets against Russell. The titles of these are symptomatic.* The Rev. Dr. I. M. Haldeman, famous Baptist fundamentalist and millennialist, wrote a pamphlet on *A Great Counterfeit, or The False and Blasphemous Religion called Russellism and Millennial Dawnism.* He wrote a second one on *Millennial Dawnism the Blasphemous Religion which teaches the Annihilation of Jesus Christ.* A Scandinavian of Chicago named A. Nyman wrote *Astounding Errors; The Prophetic Message of the Seventh Day Adventists and the Chronology of Pastor C. T. Russell in the Light of History and Bible Knowledge.* Mr. Nyman offered his house, worth 5,000 dollars, to any Russellist who could prove that the 2,300 days began in 454 B.C. The house is still his own.

Russell led his followers to think of him as "that faithful and wise steward whom his lord shall make ruler over his household" (Luke xii. 42). When a man does so we have a right to enquire whether he is really "faithful and wise," and whether the character of his life is such that it witnesses to his vocation.

Russell took quite seriously the words, "Be wise like a serpent" (BE, September 26, 1911). He was clever indeed.

He had a keen sense of the value of advertising, as we saw in his use of the newspapers and of a moving picture. Another way was a so-called investigation of conditions in the mission field. It was performed from the deck of a fast steamer. Russell stayed a few hours in Japan, and landed in Honolulu while the ship was coaling. His newspaper gave a description of the "Pastor" addressing huge crowds, while the facts of the case are that he made no address at all. All this can be seen in the *Brooklyn Eagle* for February 19, 1912, with a photo of a letter by W. G. Smith, editor of the *Hawaiian Star*, exposing this statement of Russell.

Taking liberties with truth did not happen only then. In his books Russell quoted Greek and Hebrew words frequently, although he never learned either of these languages, and his ignorance was publicly exposed. Here is a sample of his scholarship. "A depth of significance is found in the meaning of the name Elijah. It signifies God (Mighty One) of Jehovah" (SE, ii. 265). He said under oath that he knew the Greek language, but had to admit within an hour that he did not know it when he found himself unable to name the letters of the Greek alphabet

* W. L. Biederwolf, *Russellism Unveiled.* W. G. Moorehead, "Millennial Dawn a Counterfeit of Christianity," in *Fundamentals*, vol. vii., pp. 106-127. A. A. Saleeby, *Truth Triumphant, or Falsehood stripped of its Mask.* J. E. Forrest, *Errors of Russellism.*

on p. 447 of Westcott and Hort's Greek Testament, when asked to do so by the court.*

Another failing of Russell brought forth a certain aspect of moral slipperiness which he included probably in the wisdom of a serpent. His character exhibits in the study of his dealing with the other sex clear evidence of a diseased mind, affected with a morbid form of sensuality. He is not to be held responsible for the episode of Sophie Hosan (BE, August 14, 1909), except that in her case, and in others, it seems clear that the "Pastor," on certain occasions, used unguarded language which led unbalanced and hysterical girls to think of him as their "bridegroom."

More serious is Rose Bell's case. She was a young stenographer working for him. Her name was given as co-respondent in the divorce suit brought by Mrs. Russell. Russell managed to prevent further investigation. Rose Bell was married to a convert, and she and her husband conveniently left for Australia before she could be subpœnaed as a witness (BE, October 28 and 29, 1911). In Russell's divorce trial evidence was given on his familiarities with housemaids; and Mrs. Russell declared under oath that her husband had said, after one of his "affairs," "I am like a jellyfish. I float around here and there. I touch this one and that one, and if she responds I take her to me; and if not, I float on to others" (BE, October 29, 1911).

Mrs. Russell obtained a divorce in her favour, the court granting her an alimony of £8 a month. Russell's property amounted then to $317,000 (more than £60,000). Not being a good loser, he hit upon the plan of transferring all his property to the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society—namely, to himself under a corporate name. The society promised to pay the alimony, but did not (BE, May 4, 1909). As the judgment was delivered in Pennsylvania and the Society's headquarters were in the State of New York, Russell could laugh at the law, on condition, of course, of avoiding the State of Pennsylvania or of passing through it incognito. It is very difficult to travel much in America and avoid Pennsylvania, which is called the Key-Stone State of the Union.

We would suggest to Russellites that the fact that Russell was able to avoid the prison sentence waiting for him at Pittsburg should be called a miracle.

We also suggest that it was due to a special Providence that some other shady transactions did actually take place before the Federal Income Tax Law was enacted. For instance, in order to defraud his wife, the "Pastor" sold property valued $20,000 for $200 (BE, October 28, 1911). Another piece of slipperiness

* T. C. Johnson, *Some Modern Isms*, 1919, p. 112.

was his selling for $50 to the Watch Tower (namely to himself under another name) of a house worth $35,000, again in order to defraud his wife (BE, November 27, 1911). Such " business ability " would now bring a man to gaol in any part of the United States. Then the law was powerless.

Finally, we suggest that the many trips taken over the country by Russell to dodge attorney service were manifestly meant to help the spreading of the new religion.

The dummy corporation established by Russell had a stock of $1,000. The " Pastor " owned personally 99 of the 100 voting shares. A half-share belonged to E. C. Hennings, who had married Rose Bell. Hennings lived in Australia, and must have voted by a proxy given to Russell at the Annual Meeting of the Corporation. That was a very simple performance, since there remained one other member, J. A. Bohnet, who owned only half a share, and was only a straw man for Russell. Evidently the " Pastor " took no chances.

To the end of his life Russell practised the little game of investing through dummies, and of increasing the number of his holdings in his so-called Corporations. At one time he held 47,000 voting shares at $10 each. This amount represents only a part of the fortune accumulated since he organized the Russellite movement.

With the help of another dummy corporation Russell duped Bishop Whitehead of Pittsburg and other ministers into supporting as trustees and helping to finance a cemetery deal which yielded him a very handsome profit. Naturally these clergymen did not know that the thing was a mere real-estate speculation, and that Russell was behind it (BE, November 5, 1911).

One of the most remarkable financial schemes of the " Pastor " was the selling of " Miracle Wheat " for seed at $1 a pound, or $60 a bushel. It was really worth about $1 a bushel. " Brother " Dockey sold it for " Brother " Bohnet, who gave the profits to the " Work." The Russellite sold it without guarantee. After an investigation by the Federal Department of Agriculture and a campaign by the *Brooklyn Eagle*, the money obtained from farmers under false pretences was returned (BE, September 22 and 29, 1911).

Russell would probably have found himself in gaol had the same Federal law then existed for his speculations in brick, coal, asphalt, and turpentine with money which he had claimed to be no longer his own (BE, November 19, 1911).

Russell was probably sincere in advertising a cancer cure by a caustic paste of chloride of zinc given, for a price, under the seal of secrecy. This is a well-known treatment, of no value

at all. The "Pastor" probably hastened the death of many sufferers, especially in the country and in small towns; but their contributions did help the cause (BE, August 9 and 27, 1916). Since Russell often influenced the sick to make their wills in his favour, one wonders whether some of these cancer sufferers may not have been among them. Lawsuits must have been his hobby. He seems to have been engaged in litigations half his life, although he always lost.

He sued the *Brooklyn Eagle* for $100,000 damages for a cartoon on the "Miracle Wheat" episode. The jury returned a verdict against him in forty minutes (*cf.* BE, January 29, 1913; May 10, 1915).

The "Pastor," who had attacked the *Eagle* at length in his *People's Pulpit* (vol. iii., October, 1911), was wise enough to keep his followers in ignorance of the sequel. There is, however, a great dislike of possible reporters of the *Eagle*. When the writer went to the offices of the Russellites in Brooklyn to ask for some information, he must have been taken for one of them, as he was received with a more suspicious attitude than in any place he ever visited in his life.

With the threat of lawsuits backed by his large income Russell thought that he could intimidate clergymen who would attempt to expose his character. Thus he prosecuted for libel the Rev. J. J. Ross of Hamilton, Ontario. The case was thrown out of court. He tried again, balked, and finally appeared against Mr. Ross. As always, Russell lost (BE, January 11, February 8, March 2 and 18, April 2 and 4, 1913).

The divorce case instituted by his wife lasted five years. He thought he could tire her out. He lost every one of his appeals, and in the end the Superior Court of the State gave the following final opinion (BE, October 28, 1911): "His course of conduct towards his wife evidences such insistent egotism and extravagant self-praise that it would be manifest to the jury that his conduct towards her was one of continual domination that would necessarily render the life of any sensitive Christian woman a burden and make her condition intolerable." Russell declared his case to be what he called a "constructive desertion" (SE, vi., 505-506), for "many of the Lord's most faithful children live in a matrimonial furnace of affliction" (SE, vi., 507), so that they must apply the principle, "When they persecute you in one city, flee ye into another" (SE, vi., 508).

Grasping and dishonest in money matters, morbid in his attitude towards the other sex, untruthful, self-satisfied, fond of litigation, Russell would have been expelled from the ministry of any decent church. Is that the kind of person that Christ would make "ruler over all that he hath" (Luke xii. 44)?

Or is it the one of whom He says, " He will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion with the unbelievers " (Luke xii. 46) ? Is the doctrine better than the man ?

The backbone of Russell's system is a chronology. It is based on the statement that " the world has, aside from the Bible, no means of tracing its chronology farther than 776 B.C." (SE, ii., 36). It is evident that Russell's knowledge of ancient history was limited to some old book picked up second-hand or some antiquated encyclopædia. He even tells us that " the thread of Bible chronology dropped 536 B.C. at a point where secular history is reliable." Before that, " 3,000 years ago," " in the Babylonian, Syrian [*sic*] and Egyptian histories bring us to a period where their records are fragmentary and involved in great obscurity " (SE, ii., 36). Russell was not, however, satisfied with Ussher's Biblical chronology, and he reckoned Adam's birth in 4129. Whether geologists object does not matter. They are wrong (SE, ii., 33-35).

So the millennium *began* in A.D. 1872. The year 1881 marks the close of the special favour to the Gentiles (SE, ii., 235). The present Governments must all be overturned about the close of A.D. 1914, a period which is parallel to the year A.D. 70 (SE, ii., 242). In " one hour " judgment shall come upon Christendom (SE, ii., 278). The times of the Gentiles will be reached in A.D. 1914. October, 1914, will mark the culmination of the stress of great times of trouble, which will take place between 1910 and 1912 (SE, ii., 76-78). In 1914 a civil power will pass entirely into the hands of the true church (*i.e.*, the Russellites) (SE, ii., 278). The Gentile Governments will be dashed to pieces like a potter's vessel . . . that date will be the farthest limit of the rule of imperfect men. . . . At that date the kingdom of God . . . will be set up or firmly established in the earth on the ruins of present institutions (SE, ii., 76, 78). The final end of the Kingdoms of this world and the full establishment of the Kingdom of God will be accomplished at the end of 1914 (SE, ii., 99). The battle of the great day of God Almighty (Rev. xvi. 14) will end in 1914 (SE, ii., 101). The Jews will then be received in full favour (SE, ii., 221).

Such are the dates given by Russell. How Russellites can still believe in the Pastor goes beyond our comprehension. It is quite evident that the end of the world is overdue. In the *Watch Tower* for January 1, 1924, p. 5, we find the following statement: " We might expect the harvest to end fifty years after 1874, or with the end of 1924." However, on p. 3 we find a loophole prepared, when the date 1928 becomes possible if the fifty years are dated from 1878.

Russell's interpretation of the Great Pyramid has been used

by his missionaries in order to impress occasional audiences. He said that it was built by Melchidezek (SE, iii., 322), whom he declared to be the same as Shem. Russell never saw a *History of Egypt* in his life, he had never heard the name of Sir Flinders Petrie, and did not know that the name of Khufu is found on quarry marks on the building stones, and that we have also an inscription of his (Breasted, *Ancient Records*, i., 180), telling us that he built his pyramid beside the Temple of Isis, mistress of the Pyramids, which is beside the house of the Sphinx. Russell did not know that there were pyramids built before and after Khufu. In fact, he never heard of Khufu.

Russell is to be excused for not knowing the history of Egypt. But he did not know any kind of history. His description of the French Terror (SE, ii., 53) is laughable. He thinks that no Protestant was allowed to live in France after the massacre of Saint Bartholomew (SE, iii., 39). The times of the Gentiles began with Nebuchadnezzar in 606. What a shame that all these calculations must be upset with Gadd's discovery of a new date for the Fall of Nineveh, which shows that we Gentiles were given six years too many. Russell tells us seriously that David and Solomon had nearly conquered the world. "It surely looked as though the crown of universal dominion was almost within their grasp" (SE, ii., 82).

Indeed, we may say that Russell is to be excused for not knowing any history, for he did not know the first essential of the Christian religion. Apparently he had not "learned Christ." He has been called an Arian. This is a libel on Arianism, of which Russell was totally ignorant. His teaching about Christ was his own, and, indeed, the most original and the most pitiful in his whole system.

Russell did not really believe in Christ at all, but in the archangel Michael, who became Christ (SE, v., 83; i., 176-179). Christ was only a creature (SE, i., 177-179, 188). There was no Incarnation (SE, i., 179-180, 184). The body of the Lord was not raised from the dead (SE, ii., 125-130). Christ became again a spirit after His death (SE, i., 231). Were Russell logical he should say that he became Michael again. These ideas of Russell are probably not understood by his followers because they are hidden under a smoke-screen of professed orthodoxy and deep reverence for the Scriptures. The "Pastor" realized, however, that the reading of the Bible was dangerous to his followers unless they had blinkers on; so he wrote, "If anyone lays the Scripture Studies aside even after he has used them, after he has become familiar with them, after he has read them for ten years—if he lays them aside and ignores them and goes to the Bible alone, though he has understood his Bible for ten

years, our experience shows that within two years he goes into darkness. On the other hand, if he had merely the Scripture Studies, with their references, and had not read a page of the Bible as such, he would be in the right at the end of two years, because he would have the light of the Scriptures" (*Watch Tower*, September 15, 1910).

The reading of the Scriptures has not always led men to sound theology, but we believe that it leads normal men to love Christ and to abhor the silly blasphemy which makes Him, the Saviour of the world, a mere manifestation of an angel.

What can one expect after this? Is it to be wondered that Russell says that God has a body (SE, i., 200), and that he is so misinformed, or so misleading, that he defines the Trinity as a belief in "three Gods in one person" (SE, v., 55, 63, 76)? It is true that Russell had not a very clear conception of the meaning of the word "divinity." He identified it with immortality (SE, i., 208). Neither was his idea of divinity very lofty: the Russellites are all potential gods because they are to become sharers of the Divine nature, and will be exalted as Christ was after His death.

Russell maintains a strange and ominous silence on the Holy Spirit. He makes only a casual mention of the Day of Pentecost. Thus does he differ very much from the numerous Nazarene and Pentecostal movements. The "Pastor" did not care for a religion intensely real.

Any measure of success that Russellism has achieved can be ascribed to the following causes:

America is a big country, and there are millions of unchurched people in it who are at the same time orthodox and not well informed about religion.

American religion has been highly emotional. The ministers of the churches which a generation ago preached a highly evangelical doctrine have gone in a good deal for social aspects of religion. This left a void for which millennialism and speculation on eschatology may be a substitute.

The level of education is, after all, very low. The proof of this statement can be seen in the kind of moving pictures that seem to satisfy the American public. Largely on account of a hurried way of living, and a craze for amusement, most people's ability to think has been largely atrophied.

The Bible is not nearly as well known in America as in England. In a recent class of freshmen in a great American college none knew who Moses was.

This state of affairs does not prevent hostility to modernism and higher criticism. Russell posed as the defender of the inspired Bible against the critics. There are many people

who resent the leadership of the educated. Russell and the "lecturers" of his movement appealed to them. Russellism is wonderfully well organized to ward off any possible heresy. Russell's books are very cheap. Russell's teaching does not ask for a change of heart, a new birth. It is not a "narrow way." It does not teach humility and repentance. There is in the air besides orthodoxy, and often in the same minds, a good deal of unbelief. Russell did not emphasize certain parts of the Christian doctrine which are often spoken against. We saw that he did not even know what these points were. As an epidemic Russellism will probably die out within a very few years. Unhappily, its adherents will, in many cases, become unbelievers. Their stay within the International Bible Students' Association will not have improved them.

As a disease, "Russellitis" should be treated with plenty of light. Those exposed to it should be shown, unless history means nothing to them, that Russell juggled with meaningless dates. Nothing happened in 1874, when Christ should have returned, according to Russell (SE, ii., 187, 199, 234-45, *versus* Matt. xxiv. 23-27). The resurrection of the saints in 1878 (SE, iii., 234-235; 302-305) is not a resurrection at all; moreover, its occurrence then contradicts the teaching of 1 Cor. xv. and 1 Thess. iv. The fall of the kingdoms and the reign of the Russellites since 1914 and 1915 are hard to believe. The *Brooklyn Eagle* should certainly have been destroyed in that case.

One should also call attention to the *vanity* of reckonings on the second coming of Christ, and their harmfulness (*cf.* Matt. xxv. 36, and Mark xii. 32).

As a preventive measure, one should teach the full Gospel as a wonderful message of grace. Adventism and Millennialism would not prosper if the Church had not too often forgotten that the world is fleeting, as philosophers say, or "that we have no abiding city," which is the New Testament way of saying it. Granting honestly that much that is obsolete and cruel has been said about hell, we should not throw away the truth enshrined in the old beliefs, which is to say that we should not have a loose idea about God and His justice, that hell and heaven are revelations of character, that sin is real, and that the new birth and everlasting life are intimately connected. In a community where such preventive treatment was adequately given, "Russellitis" would not have a chance to become endemic. Perhaps the greatest need of the Church to-day is an apologetic, not written by philosophers and for scholars, not appealing to the intelligence only, but to the whole of man, and giving the whole of the truth in Christ.

JOHN A. MAYNARD.

THE FOUR GOSPELS:* THEIR TEXT AND ORIGIN

Introductory.

The origin and mutual relations of the four Canonical Gospels can never cease to be a matter of profound interest to all Christian people: and since the rise and development within the last century of the science of historical criticism and of its application to documents, our knowledge has taken an immense leap forward. In the early days of the Church the absorbing question was that of the credentials of the Four Gospels. They were in the first instance canonized instinctively. Without any organized discussion, without certainly any formal pronouncement, the instinct of Churchmen leapt to the conclusion that in them, and in no other writings, was contained the authoritative written evidence of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. So deeply rooted was this conviction that before the end of the second century a writer as able as Irenæus of Lyons could find, as he looked round on the world of nature, analogies to bear out the presumption that the Gospels could neither have been more nor less than four. That can only mean that by the year 150, at latest, the actual position of the Canonical Gospels in the Church was assured. To question any of them, to add any other to them, became of itself an indication of disloyalty. However variable the order in which the four were arranged, no manuscript, no version, no ecclesiastical writer after that date gives the slightest indication that anywhere within the limits of the Universal Church was doubt of their unique authority entertained.

No doubt each of the four had its individual history. There were intervals between the composition of the different Gospels, though the extreme terms between the first and last of the four hardly covered more than a generation. Each local church in which one or other of the four was composed would have, for a time, a special predilection for the Gospel of which it knew the history at first hand; but the significant fact is the rapidity with which the four were combined. So soon as the teaching and testimony of eye-witnesses were no longer available, Christians everywhere were eager to collect all and any authorized tradition of the Master's life on earth. Never was intercourse between different churches so vivid and continuous, never was the centripetal tendency so dominant, never the sense of give and take between the scattered groups which constituted the

* *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins.* By B. H. Streeter. Macmillan. 1924. 21s.

Christian fellowship so untiringly active, as in the days when formal organization to connect the churches was still in the future. The scanty records of Christian history between St. Clement at the end of the first and St. Irenæus at the end of the second century consist largely of notices of the travel of individual Christians, or of the epistolary intercourse of different and often distant churches. It would be difficult to find many later parallels to the visit of Polycarp to Rome in A.D. 155. Common means of intercommunication, common use of one language, above all, the common inspiration of a faith and life shared as an exclusive inheritance in the face of a hostile world, made Christian unity a more real thing in the second century than it ever was at any later date. One of the greatest of its fruits was the consensus by which the four Gospels were accepted or "canonized."

The Formation of the Canon.

With the pressure of the Gnostic controversy the question forced itself to the front. On what principle do Catholic Christians admit these documents as Gospels, and no others? And the answer of the "great Church" was the same answer as was given in relation to the Creed, the Sacraments, and the Ministry. They were "apostolic": that is, they embodied the tradition of the Apostles, the accredited representatives of Jesus Christ. If it was objected that two of the four Gospels did not even profess to be written by Apostles, the reply was formulated a little later by Tertullian: If the authors were not *apostoli*, they were *apostolici viri*, disciples of Apostles, representatives of the "apostolic" tradition.

In the great outburst of Christian theological writing which began with Eusebius and the Peace under Constantine, the problem came up again in regard to the line of demarcation to be drawn about some books of relatively less importance, epistles and apocalypses, accepted in some churches but not in all, principally the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse of St. John. Was the criterion of apostolic authorship final? If Hebrews was not written by St. Paul, the Apocalypse not by St. John the son of Zebedee, were they therefore *ipso facto* uncanonical? And a new criterion emerged, a criterion which was only possible after the lapse of a good many generations from the apostolic ages—namely, the tradition of the Church or of its most distinguished writers. So Dionysius of Alexandria had already in the third century professed his acceptance of the Apocalypse, though he attributed it to "another John"; and so Jerome recommended the acceptance of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whether or no it was by St. Paul. The need for a

uniform New Testament was so obvious that in the end the divergences still actual in the fourth century were overcome, and the Western Church canonized the Epistle to the Hebrews and the churches of the Greek (though not the Syriac) East canonized the Apocalypse.

But the criticism of earlier ages did not deal fundamentally with more than insistent theological questions, such as that of the authority on which the New Testament documents were accepted. Scholars from time to time raised literary or historical problems: Africanus, Origen, Eusebius were not unaware of the existence of discrepancies between the Gospels. More was done on textual criticism, because divergence of texts, especially in the Gospels, was patent and pressed for consideration. The recensions of Hesychius and Lucian, the Eusebian sections, Jerome's revised version of the Latin Gospels, Rabbula's Peshitta New Testament in Syriac, represent attempts, more or less official, to meet the need.

Still, when all is said, the problems of the historical relationships and the literary analysis of the Gospels were, a century ago, almost virgin field. To the Tübingen school we owe the first attempt to work it: and no amount of disagreement with their actual conclusions ought to conceal from us the significance of their work as pioneers. Doubtless they were dazzled by the splendour of the vista which the new science seemed to open up to them: doubtless they dealt with history too exclusively under the guidance of a system of philosophy, as though the Hegelian formula of " thesis, antithesis, synthesis " were a master-key to unlock every door. They exaggerated one aspect of the evidence, they discredited in quite arbitrary fashion the genuineness of documents which would not square with their own idea of the course of events. But they were not wrong, they were right, in refusing to treat history as a mere congeries of facts without inner nexus between them, and in trying to see what were the broad lines of action, reaction, and interaction which do make one set of facts more significant than another. They erred by pushing their discoveries beyond the point where they were justified by the evidence. They did not err in substance when they asserted the existence in the early Church of a Judaic-Christian conception, of a counter-conception in Gentile Christian circles, and of a reconciliation of elements of both conceptions in the Catholic Church. They were wrong in supposing that Peter and Paul represented antagonistic parties, and they enormously undervalued the unifying impulse of common discipleship of one Master. Yet the Epistle of James and the Epistle to the Galatians do mark a different emphasis: Luke did write the Acts with the definite

purpose of showing that Peter and Paul made each an indispensable contribution to the progress of Christian evangelization.

What they failed to realize, in anything like its true extent, was that the harmonization was extraordinarily rapid. It did not take a century, it took barely a generation, before antagonisms subsided under the imperative call for unity, before irreconcilable extremes dropped away, and the catholic and apostolic Church was seen to be a living and concrete reality.

It was in a common adherence to the Person of Christ and the tradition of His teaching that Christians found their centre of union. That tradition was not at first embodied in Gospels. The essential facts of the Passion, the Resurrection, and the Appearances that guaranteed the Resurrection, were from quite primitive days crystallized into a (presumably baptismal) formula; just as from the same primitive days the ethical instruction of catechumens must have been based on Sayings of Jesus which would tend to be stereotyped into a collection or collections. As long as original disciples were alive and accessible, fresh sources of testimony were continually at hand to reinforce with fresh material the first Gospel nucleus. Every new convert would be perpetually adding to the stock of his knowledge by cross-examination of those who were Christians before him. So in process of time the mass of tradition would be enlarged and diffused; but with diffusion would come an element of vagueness or uncertainty, which could be controlled indeed where authoritative witnesses were present, but which, as the band of personal disciples dwindled and disappeared, would create in the minds of the second generation an urgent demand for the fixation of the tradition in the form of written documents.

In some such way, we must suppose, our Gospels came into being. Of their origin and authorship, of their time and place and mutual relationships, we have scattered data of tradition, which, where they are early and constant, have strong *prima facie* claims to acceptance. But we have also now, and this was an unworked field until comparatively recent years, the results of internal evidence, of the literary criticism and analysis which two generations of scholars have been patiently bringing into clearer and clearer light. On the whole, it may be said with truth that the two lines of evidence, tradition and analysis, converge, so far as both are at our disposal, very much more than they differ. But the newer process has taken us a great deal further than without it we should ever have succeeded in arriving. We know now more about our Gospels, and their right to be regarded as giving us an authoritative representation of our Lord's life and teaching, than any Christians have done since those in whose day they were written.

Tradition reports to us that the Second Gospel was the work of Mark, that it stood in some close relation with the ministry and preaching of St. Peter, and that it was written in Rome. Papias, a witness from Asia Minor, who may have published his *Interpretations of the Lord's Sayings* between A.D. 130 and 140—his intellectual equipment was small and excited the contempt of Eusebius, but that is not in itself a reason for discrediting his testimony to fact or tradition—states as the special characteristic of this Gospel its accurate, though not articulated, record of the words and deeds of Christ. Of Matthew we are told, again by Papias, that he composed a collection of sayings of (or, possibly, of prophecies about) Jesus Christ in Aramaic, the native language of Palestinian Christians. The author of the Third Gospel and the Acts writes in the latter book as a companion of St. Paul, and tradition asserted that the companion in question was Luke, described in the Epistle to the Colossians as the beloved physician. And, lastly, the Fourth Gospel was unanimously believed to be the latest of them all, dictated in extreme old age by John, "he who lay on the bosom of the Lord," at Ephesus.

There is not one of these data that has been (I will not merely say disproved, but even) rendered improbable by modern criticism. It is otherwise, of course, with some of the deductions that were often or generally drawn from them. The practically unanimous consensus of critics rejects the possibility that the First Gospel as we have it can be the writing of the apostle Matthew. But I am clear for myself that a Gospel so early, so widely, and so predominantly used—witness not merely Ignatius but also Justin Martyr—must have been both primitive and authoritative. Somewhere behind it place must be found for the Apostle: not to say that Matthew was far too obscure a figure among the Twelve to have been a likely choice for pseudonymous ascription. Many of us, again, find it hard to believe that the author of the Fourth Gospel was the Apostle the son of Zebedee: but here again the evidence for supposing that the author was an eyewitness of the events he described seems to me to be convincing, and, though Dr. Burney has not persuaded scholars that the Gospel was written in Aramaic, his argument appears to prove that the author thought, so to say, in Aramaic, and must therefore have been a Palestinian Jew.

The Development of Textual Criticism.

But the two departments in which the work of criticism during the past century has been most novel and most significant are those of the Synoptic problem and of the textual

criticism of the Gospels. The former of these was never realized as a problem at all in ancient times; and even in the earlier stages of the historical study of the New Testament, critics were content with deducing a theory of the relationships of the three first Gospels from their individual and often arbitrary conceptions of doctrinal development. Textual criticism has had a longer history: but between the earlier Fathers and St. Jerome on the one side, and Griesbach in the latter part of the eighteenth century on the other, though there was from time to time good work done and valuable material amassed, there was little progress and no concerted movement.

In this field the last hundred years has effected nothing less than a revolution. The critical editions of Lachmann (1831, 1842–50), Tregelles (1857–72), Tischendorf (ed. octava critica maior 1869–72), Westcott and Hort (1881), have succeeded, after a prolonged and sometimes bitter struggle, in dethroning the so-called Textus Receptus from the position of authority it had enjoyed for wellnigh a millennium and a half: Burgon, its last considerable defender, died in 1888, and no one is ever likely to raise a voice in its favour again.

Forty years ago the constructive results of the great critical editors seemed assured of the same permanence as the destructive. The Byzantine text had gone, the text of the great Greek manuscripts had been put into its place, and the problem of the oldest attainable form of the New Testament appeared to be settled once for all. Nevertheless, tentatively and gradually at first, but now more and more insistently, a newer generation of critics has begun to ask whether, after all, the question of the oldest text is *res iudicata*: whether witnesses who were still more ancient than the great Greek manuscripts have had the proper weight given to their evidence: whether we could continue to rest satisfied that the text of Alexandria was likely to be so much better than texts preserved elsewhere that we could neglect the latter, or whether, though the scholars and scribes of Alexandria were on a much higher level of education and training than any others, they might not be for that very reason the more exposed to the danger of treating the text of the Gospels on the same *a priori* methods as their heathen teachers and contemporaries treated the text of Homer.* And these questionings have been reinforced by a constant current in the same direction of the discovery of new material, and the re-examination of existing material. The minute accuracy of the Latin version of Irenæus has been triumphantly vindicated against Hort's

* On the Alexandrine treatment of Homer, see, for instance, Cobet's *Miscellanea Critica* (1876, pp. 225 *ff.*), a discussion to which my attention was called by Dr. Charles Harris.

aspersions.* Two newly known Greek manuscripts, W and Θ, show us a "Western"—or, as I prefer to call it, an "unrevised"—element in Egypt and in north-eastern Asia Minor. The Syriac and Egyptian versions, the oldest we have outside the Latin, have been made accessible to us in completer and purer form by Professor Burkitt and Mr. Horner: and neither of them is a constant ally of the ℵ B tradition.

The *prima facie* grounds for reconsideration and modification of Hort's verdict are overwhelming: and these can now be reinforced by a line of argument which approaches the problem from a quite different angle, the internal evidence of the three Synoptic Gospels and their mutual relationships.

The very term "Synoptic Gospels" is, I suppose, of comparatively recent invention: certainly the exact literary analysis of the interdependent Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke hardly escaped the influence of dogmatic prepossession, that is, of "tendency" writing, till within the last fifty years. Its first great achievement, the establishment of the dependence of Matthew and Luke upon Mark, is to-day assumed as the inevitable starting-point for further enquiry, but it had scarcely won its way to acceptance before the closing decade of the nineteenth century. And the recognition of Q, the document postulated to explain the close verbal agreement of Matthew and Luke in passages to which there is no parallel in Mark, is now as much a commonplace as is the originality of Mark.

These were substantial results: but they do not cover the whole ground. There are still the apparent minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in material which, as a whole, they take from Mark. There is the further investigation of the contents and limits of Q, and of the degree to which preference should be accorded to the evidence of Matthew or that of Luke in reconstructing it. And beyond the questions which arise in respect of sources already identified, there are still parts of Matthew and large parts of Luke remaining over for analysis. We have made a good beginning, but we are very far from having finished the work.

A New Contribution to Textual Criticism.

Canon Streeter's book, *The Four Gospels: a Study of Origins*, is a gallant attempt to take the enquiry a long stage further: and in two directions, in the effective use of the weapon of textual criticism in combination with historical and literary methods, and again in the examination of the structure of the Gospel according to St. Luke, and the distribution of its component

* See his *Introduction*, p. 160.

parts according to their sources, the book seems to me to mark a really big advance.

On the first count, it is not so much Dr. Streeter's actual successes in the field of textual criticism—though these are distinct and tangible—as the application of the method itself which is significant and in the result may be even startling. So far as I know, Dr. Streeter is the first writer of an important book covering the whole field of the origins and relationships of the Gospels who has thought it incumbent on him to deal with textual criticism on an extended scale. Professor Burkitt was, I think, the first writer, in his *Gospel History and its Transmission* (1906), to call in evidence of this class in dealing with the supposed agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark, and I have tried, in pursuing my studies on St. Mark's Gospel (in my Inaugural Lecture and in papers contributed to the *Journal of Theological Studies*) to work on the same lines. The crucial advantage of this method is that one approaches the problem of the text from a new angle. All textual scholars would admit that the criterion of the *internal* evidence of the superiority of the readings of one witness over those of another must in the last resort be final: Hort asserted that as strongly as anyone. But it is extraordinarily difficult to get rid, in this process, of the personal and subjective element. The new method, starting from the results of Synoptic criticism—not necessarily final or infallible results, but, nevertheless, results reached from the examination of a totally different set of phenomena and of *prima facie* validity in their own sphere—gives us a sort of objective test which reduces the danger of the individual's subjective preferences to a minimum. One accepts, that is to say, a reading, not because it is the reading of B or of D, but because it conforms, say, to Marcan usage, or because it removes a difficulty in the way of the conclusion (reached on an independent line of argument) that Matthew and Luke tapped their Marcan source without collusion with one another. In particular, the appeal to the *vera causa* of contamination of the text of one Gospel by the intrusion of matter from a parallel text in another (and especially a more familiar) Gospel, will often suggest the *prima facie* rejection of the reading of one group of authorities in favour of that of another group, without any absolute regard to their constituent members. Of course, the test is a rough one: no skilled critic will stake final results on any single method to the entire exclusion of all others: but the new method has an indefeasible claim to consideration and cannot be barred out. It would be unjust to blame Hort, whose work antedated the developments of Synoptic criticism, for passing over the evidence which this method supplies: but it

is quite just to adduce it as a further ground for the reopening of a case hitherto regarded as closed.

A simple instance will illustrate my meaning. In Mark viii. 26, the Byzantine (Syrian or Lucianic text), gives μηδὲ εἰς τὴν κώμην εἰσέλθῃς μηδὲ εἴπῃς τινὶ ἐν τῇ κώμῃ. Each half of this reading is found in some earlier authorities without the other: the B group have only μηδὲ εἰς τὴν κώμην εἰσελθῃς; the "African" text, represented by *k*, renders μηδενὶ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ κώμῃ. Hort rightly argues that the later and longer text is a conflation of the other two, and must be eliminated. But in preferring the short reading of B he leaves the other equally short reading unexplained. What if the two shorter readings, both of them pre-Syrian, are not in turn independent modifications of an original reading which contained an obvious difficulty? What if St. Mark's predilection of εἰς where Greek educated usage required ἐν was the difficulty which led to change? If he wrote something like μηδὲ εἰς τὴν κώμην εἴπῃς, and one line of transmission regularized the position by substituting εἰσέλθῃς for εἴπῃς, and the other by substituting ἐν τῇ κώμῃ for εἰς τὴν κώμην, everything becomes simple. That is to say, by the use of a new method, we have been enabled to take the process of criticism one stage further back, and we have done what Hort did not do, and have explained the genesis of the rival traditions.

It will be said that these processes can at best only lead us to an eclectic text. That is true, and, of course, in a sense it is unsatisfactory, while it certainly adds a heavy burden to the critic's task. But in the state of the evidence it seems to me inevitable: and I reckon it for good to Dr. Streeter's book that he is not afraid of the conclusion. I would commend to the attention of textual critics of the New Testament the remarks, as pertinent as they are pungent, in Professor Housman's *Manilius* (Preface to vol. i.), on the folly of accepting bad readings because they are found in good MSS.

Dr. Streeter would not claim to be by origin and training a textual critic: he has come to occupy himself with textual criticism because he has rightly realized that it is a necessary part of the equipment of anyone who wants to deal fundamentally with the Synoptic problem. For all that, he has done in this volume some excellent pioneer digging in one unworked quarter of the field—in relation to the text used by Origen at Cæsarea—where his results are striking and his case, I am inclined to think, established.

Origen is, of all ante-Nicene Greek Fathers, the most important witness to the text of the New Testament: but his works have come down to us in such fragmentary and dishevelled

shape that his evidence is not easy to disentangle. Griesbach, among his other merits, deserved well of criticism by noting the difference of text in the copies of St. Mark's Gospel which Origen used in his earlier commentary on John and in his later commentary on Matthew, the earlier being of an "Alexandrian," the later of a "Western" type. Dr. Streeter carries the investigation a first step further by restating Griesbach's results in the form "Origen used an Alexandrine (or as we should now say, an ℵ B) text in Alexandria, a 'Western' text at Cæsarea": and he goes on to work out the special class of "Western" text to which Origen's Cæsarean text of Mark bears testimony. Not D, nor the Old Latin, nor the Old Syriac: but a group of Greek authorities, "Western" in the sense that they diverge, often in company with those Western authorities alone known to Griesbach, from the Alexandrine text, but neither Western geographically nor showing any very near relationship to the geographical Westerns, yet displaying sufficient coherence with one another to be ranked as a class by themselves. All of these authorities are late, if reckoned by the standard of our leading MSS., for none is older than the eighth century: some, like the oldest of them, Θ, are of quite recent discovery, and the earliest investigation of any group among them—Ferrar's discussion of the important family of cursives to which his name is given—only goes back to A.D. 1868. Altogether there are six MSS. or families, the mutual relationship of which was established by Professor Lake in the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1923.*

Dr. Streeter's contribution to this problem consists in the propounding of the hypothesis that the ultimate text lying behind these authorities is identical with the text used by Origen at Cæsarea: and as this text was not any text he brought from Alexandria—that would have been an ℵ B text—it follows that it was presumably the text of the Cæsarean Church. In other words, we have, on this hypothesis, identified a Palestinian text earlier than the middle of the third century. If we had external evidence to connect with Jerusalem or Cæsarea any of the MSS. or groups of MSS. that make up the class, that would enhance the probability of the conclusion: but I am afraid that such evidence shrinks, when examined, to rather small proportions.†

* Namely, i, codex Θ; ii, codex 1 and its allies (1–113–131–209, to which is now added 1582); iii, codex 13 and its allies (13–69–124–346, the Ferrar group, to which are now added 230–543–788–826–828–983–1689–1709: 69, 124, 983, are said to be specially valuable); iv, codex 28; v, codex 565 (=Tischendorf's 2^{pe}, so called because it was at Petrograd=Hort's 81 [see the *Notes on Select Readings*, p. 4, being the Appendix to vol. ii. of Westcott and Hort]); vi, codex 700 (collated by H. C. Hoskier as Evan. 604). Dr. Streeter claims to have found fresh constituent members of the group, pp. 575 *ff.*

† Correct, for instance, the statement about cod. 700 on p. 105 by comparison with the fuller details on p. 49 n. 1.

Dr. Streeter's presentation of his discovery suffers from the dissipation of the evidence for it as between his text and his appendices.* Indeed, throughout I find the exposition clearer than the arrangement, as though the book had grown under the author's hand. And if Part I., The Manuscript Tradition, was intended to make the general reader conversant with the present position of textual studies, one would desiderate more attention to codex Bezæ and its Latin allies, for there lies the problem of the hour. However, it is ill asking for more, when we have got so much.

The Analysis of Luke.

But the core and centre of the book, as it has been the core and centre of Dr. Streeter's studies for, I suppose, a quarter of a century, is the Synoptic Problem. That is the subject of Part II., the longest and most important of the four sections into which the book is divided: and if, when dealing with text, one finds in Dr. Streeter an excellent and accomplished recruit, the rôles are reversed when one approaches the problem on which he is an expert of long standing and one is oneself by comparison a tyro. But even a subaltern, if called on to review the work of a general, must criticize as well as expound and must chance the probability of being wrong.

* Dr. Streeter refers more than once to the relation of the text of Origen to the texts of ℵ and B respectively; and as I have long suspected a special relation of Origen and ℵ, I will summarize my argument in a note. ℵ, before it went to Mount Sinai (presumably under the stress of the Mohammedan invasion in the seventh century), was almost certainly at Cæsarea. So magnificent a MS. must have been written for a great Church or a great person; and as it belonged to Cæsarea in the sixth or early seventh century, the presumption is strong that it was written for Cæsarea—the suggestion on p. 594 that Jerome "acquired" ℵ at Alexandria seems to me frankly ludicrous. Now we happen to know that, at about the date to which palæographers ascribe the MS., the bishops Acacius and Euzoius of Cæsarea, A.D. 340–366, were having recopied on vellum the decaying papyri of the library of their church. But ℵ, according to Dr. Streeter, does not give a Cæsarean text. There must have been, therefore, some special reason for copying it. What reason so likely as to perpetuate the rolls which Origen, the greatest name in the traditions of the local church and the particular hero of the local scholar and martyr, Pamphilus, had brought with him, rather more than a century earlier, from Alexandria? That is an *a priori* argument. But at the other end there is also the convergent argument of internal evidence. Dr. Streeter admits (pp. 101, 594 *ff.*) that "if Jerome associated any text with the name of Origen, it was that of ℵ": and I suspect myself that Jerome may have seen ℵ at Cæsarea, and have had good reason to believe that it was an *exemplum Adamantii*. Yet Dr. Streeter must suppose that Jerome, if he did think so, was wrong: for on more than one occasion (*e.g.*, pp. 56, 93) he appears to claim that there is a still nearer connection of Origen with B. I cannot think that the evidence in the least bears out this claim. The first chapter of Mark, so far as it is quoted by Origen *in Io.* gives the following results: i. 1 *νιοῦ θεοῦ* B, *om.* ℵ Origen; i. 2 *ἐγὼ* ℵ Origen, *om.* B; i. 7 *ὀπίσω μου* Origen 1/2 ℵ, *ὀπίσω* Origen 1/2 B; i. 8 *ὕδατι . . . ἐν πνεύματι* ℵ Origen, *ὕδατι . . . πνεύματι* B; i. 14 *μετὰ δέ* ℵ Origen, *καὶ μετά* B; i. 15 *καὶ λέγων* B, *om.* ℵ Origen; i. 21 *εὐθύς* Origen 1/2 ℵ, *εὐθέως* Origen 1/2 B; i. 21 *εἰσελθών* B, *om.* ℵ Origen 2/2; i. 24 *εα* ℵ^{c} (I do not see, on inspection of the photographic edition, why the correction should not belong to the original *διορθωτής*) Origen, *om.* ℵ *B; i. 24 *οἴδαμεν* ℵ Origen, *οἶδα* B. Surely this list of seven important readings in twenty-four verses, where Origen sides with ℵ against B, is extraordinarily significant.

The strength of Dr. Streeter lies, as I have said, in clarity of exposition, and this is reinforced by robust common sense. The arid desert, as most students must have thought it, of the Synoptic problem, becomes a cheerful promenade, as we wander gaily on under an engaging flow of personal reminiscence and humorous illustration. It is all right, in a sense, and no doubt it helps to keep the reader's attention fixed: you couldn't go to sleep over Dr. Streeter. And yet, and yet—there is such a thing as the dignity of the theme, and there is sometimes the danger of forgetting it. Is it necessary, in the case of the four narratives which have fed the faith of the Christian people throughout the centuries, to discuss in cold print which of them we could best spare? No doubt we have all our individual preferences: in intimate converse we may, if we like, compare the Gospels positively and negatively, but in public ought we not to confine ourselves, for the sake of our neighbour's feelings if for nothing else, to dwelling on the virtues of our favourite Evangelist without "odious comparisons" with the rest? No one will quarrel with Dr. Streeter for letting his special partiality for St. Luke's Gospel reveal itself again and again, and I think it may be his very affection for this Gospel which makes his treatment of it the best part of his book. But it has happened that my own work on the Gospels has been almost exclusively devoted to St. Mark: and it hurts to be told—in a paragraph (p. 194) to which he gives the distinction of reprint from his earlier contribution to the *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*—that we must all feel that this is the Gospel "we could best spare." When Dr. Streeter further tells us that Luke ranked Mark as an inferior authority, he contradicts his own arguments, as we shall see when we pass, as I now propose to do (postponing for the present his treatment of Mark), to the most serious contribution he has made to our fuller knowledge of the Gospels, namely, his analysis of St. Luke.

Dr. Streeter thinks that modern scholars have put themselves into bondage to a "Two-Document" hypothesis in the treatment of Matthew and Luke. And, of course, it is true historically that the first stage of reconstruction of the elements of these two Gospels was the recognition that both made use of Mark, and that the second stage was the recognition of another common source in a document consisting in the main of Sayings of our Lord, labelled conventionally Q. But I do not know that any of us supposed that enquiry should stop there or that the whole of the problem, *except so far as it concerned common sources of Matthew and Luke*, was thereby solved. When Dr. Streeter substitutes the formula "Four-Document Hypothesis," is he not himself in bondage to a phrase? Further analysis may

prove that Matthew or Luke or even both had access to more documents: or alternatively that part of their material which is here apparently assigned to written sources may have been derived direct from oral tradition. I say "apparently assigned," because if Luke was himself the author of Dr. Streeter's "Proto-Luke"—if, that is to say, "Proto-Luke" was the evangelist's own first draft of a Gospel, as Dr. Streeter himself believes—it becomes misleading to talk of it as a "document." For "document" suggests sources, and Proto-Luke's sources, apart from Q, may just as well have been oral as not. The proof that an evangelist used a written source lies primarily in the fact that another evangelist made independent use of the same source. Apart from that, the source may have been oral, and the further back we put it the greater the chance that it was. If Luke was in Cæsarea and its neighbourhood during the two years of St. Paul's Cæsarean captivity (A.D. 55–57: or possibly 56–58), and busied himself in collecting materials for a Gospel, the antecedent probability is that he set himself to gather as much material as he could from the lips of personal disciples of our Lord.

Dr. Streeter's hypothesis of Proto-Luke is entirely consistent with this conception of the facts. Christians of the second generation were eager to learn all they could about the Master: and Luke, an educated man of literary instincts, felt the desire to put together whatever he could collect into historical form. He had in Q a résumé—Palestinian in origin, but (as I think) so early and so authoritative that it probably circulated outside Palestine as well—of our Lord's ethical teaching: but he wanted, as the Roman Christians for whom St. Mark wrote wanted, something more than that. He wanted to bring the teaching into connection with the life and death and resurrection of Jesus the Christ: and so he planned a biography. Dr. Streeter, in an admirable analysis, succeeds in giving—though much must, of course, be conjectural in detail—a rough sketch of the contents of this first draft. If the evangelist had published his draft, his would have been the earliest Gospel. But I agree with Dr. Headlam (quoted on p. 221) that there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that he did publish it. Rather, I do not doubt that he kept it by him in the hope of amassing further material: possibly, indeed, his plans were interrupted by the decision to send St. Paul to Rome, and he may have taken with him from Palestine pieces like the story of the Birth and Infancy with which he intended to enrich his narrative before publication. Anyhow, the work had not been put into its ultimate shape when he came across the Gospel which Mark had written. He recognized its historical value and, from its connection with

St. Peter, its peculiar authority. He set himself, therefore, to incorporate into his own book all that he could get in without exceeding the limits of a papyrus roll, and without dropping more than he could help or spare of his own material. How much, if any, of the latter he excised we cannot tell: we can only tell how much of St. Mark's Gospel he put in, and it is to me more surprising that he put in so much than that he left out what he did. Where he found nothing in St. Mark, as in the Resurrection narrative,* he retained what he had written unaltered. Where he found a parallel account to his own, as in the Passion narrative—for which *ex hypothesi* St. Peter was not an eye-witness—he interwove here and there a sentence or a paragraph. But throughout the narrative of the Ministry he added in large blocks as much as he could work in without disturbing the *cadre* and general arrangement of his own draft Gospel. Nothing in Dr. Streeter's book is more illuminating than his comparison (pp. 166, 167) of the opposite methods of Matthew and Luke in their borrowings from Mark. Matthew tends to group sayings and even incidents where the subject-matter is the same or similar: but though he habitually upsets the order of Mark, he has worked his system with such meticulous care that there is very little of Mark that does not find a place somewhere or other in his Gospel. On the other hand Luke, as was natural in an author who had a draft Gospel already in his hands, inserts pure Marcan material at select points only, but on each occasion where he does so the insertion attains considerable dimensions. That would not, of course, exclude minor borrowings from Mark in the rest of the story, or minor adaptations from his own existing material in Marcan passages. But in the main St. Luke's account of the Ministry can be broken up into *strata*, respectively Marcan and non-Marcan—or rather pre-Marcan.

This is admirable analysis, and to myself, as at present advised, it carries conviction. But I have given the argument in my own words, because I should want to distinguish between Dr. Streeter's gift for analysis and the general sanity of his treatment on the one side, and on the other what seems to me his over-fondness for detecting "tendency" and—what corresponds to this in the larger sphere—his weakness (as I think it) on the historical side. He sees differences, while he is relatively blind to agreements: his conception of Christian origins is centrifugal rather than centripetal. There are not many judgments of his on the Church history of the second century with which I do not find myself in some measure of disagreement.

Of course, there were "tendencies" in the apostolic as in any

* I am glad to find that Dr. Streeter holds, as I have long held, that both Matthew and Luke had before them Mark in the same imperfect form as we have.

other age. There is "tendency" in the treatment by Matthew and Luke of their Marcan material. But the "tendency" of their changes is in the main the same: what we find most prominent is not a Judaizing or a Hellenizing tendency characteristic of one and the other respectively, but in both a tendency common to the second generation of Christians: a "tendency," that is, to avoid all language that seemed too familiar about Jesus, to suppress any attribution to Him of strong emotion, to replace the human name by reverential titles. But the traces of any attempt to colour according to party bias the presentation of His teaching are remarkably few, and some that we do find in Matthew are possibly more or less unconscious. Dr. Streeter, though his literary judgment revolts against the wholesale rejection of documents by the Tübingen school, has not, I think, entirely escaped their fondness for detecting warring "tendencies" between Christians of the apostolic and sub-apostolic age. There were differences, bitter enough, before the conception of the Catholic character of the Church was admitted. But the common allegiance to the Christian name was more potent than any difference: and no one was more of a conciliator (as the Tübingen writers recognized) than Luke himself. "Peter and Paul" was the watchword alike of the Acts, of Clement, of Ignatius. The four Gospels vie with one another in emphasizing the pre-eminence of the Twelve, and of Peter among the Twelve: indeed, it may be said that the Gospel which least emphasizes his special position is just the Gospel to which he stands in closest relation. "I of Paul," "And I of Cephas," were war-cries which had almost ceased to find their echo among the Christians for whom our Gospels were written.

The Value of Mark.

As with Luke, so with Mark. The author of our earliest canonical Gospel has indeed been charged with an "ecclesiastical" tendency: but the same charge is brought against the author of the First Gospel and the author of Acts, and if "ecclesiastical" tendencies were so primitive and so widespread we may wonder whether after all they do not go back to the very beginning of things, to the original εὐαγγέλιον of the first disciples. But in any case Mark cannot be charged with Petrine or Pauline bias, or with any consciousness of the possibility of such a thing. Himself the disciple of both the great Apostles, he wrote for a Church which looked up to both as its "founders," and cherished the memories and the relics of both. If the unvarying tradition which connects his Gospel with the teaching and preaching of St. Peter has any basis in fact—and

analysis of the Gospel seems to me to go far to bear it out*—then we have in Mark a witness of quite special authority. It is one of the notable omissions in Dr. Streeter's book that he has practically nothing to say about this aspect of the problem. He nowhere, I think, throws doubt upon the tradition, but he nowhere emphasizes its significance. His silence is of a piece with what I should call his general belittling of this Gospel. He devotes a chapter to a lucid and ample statement of the argument for regarding Matthew and Luke as dependent on Mark (not on any Ur-Marcus: Dr. Streeter piles a few more stones on that unhonoured grave), and another, excellent as far as it goes,† to the discussion of some of the more obvious agreements or apparent agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark. Perhaps I may be forgiven for the suspicion that full treatment is accorded to this aspect of St. Mark's Gospel because it is a necessary preliminary to the study of St. Luke's. Similarly the chapter on Q, where, of course, Dr. Streeter begins to tread on more debatable ground, subserves, obviously enough, the purposes of the analysis of Luke, the more so that Dr. Streeter arrives at the conclusion that Luke has preserved the source common to him with Matthew in the more accurate and complete form. If I provisionally follow Dr. Streeter in this (I suppose novel) conclusion, my chief reason is the confidence I feel in him as a guide when he is analyzing and expounding St. Luke. But I think he would not himself deny that the element of partiality may in this or that detail have tended to overcloud his judgment.‡ St. Luke is to him what codex B was to Hort: our general confidence is first based on a large number of individual cases, and is then employed as turning the scale in the remaining and more doubtful instances.

One last remark as to Dr. Streeter's verdicts on the Second Gospel: "Mark's native tongue was Aramaic, and his Greek is quite the most colloquial in the New Testament" (p. 296). But when you learn a new language late in life—indeed, when you

* Take, for instance, the predominance in Mark, as compared with Matthew and Luke, of the use of the plural in recording the movements of our Lord and his disciples. Mark, that is, is written from the standpoint of one who actually shared in the movements: the two later evangelists, biographers and not autobiographers, prefer the singular.

† I say "as far as it goes," because I doubt if the ghost, raised by these apparent agreements, will ever be laid without an exhaustive enumeration and classification of every one of them. The Seminar with which I am connected has been for some time engaged in the preparation of such a *catalogue raisonneé*.

‡ The parallels drawn out on p. 280 (Mark xiii. 11=Luke xii. 11, 12=Matt. x. 19, 20) are in one respect defective: the omission of any reference to the companion set of parallels Mark xii. 9=Matt. xxiv. 9=Luke xxi. 12 does withdraw evidence that at least affects Matthew. And in reference to the omission of πῶς ἤ, for "Mark" read "Matthew:" and conversely in the first line of the note for "Mt." read "Mk." [In the last line of the large type on p. 214 the words "clearly non-Marcan" are an intrusion where they stand.]

learn it at all—it is exactly not "colloquial" idiom that you learn. If Mark learnt Greek for the purpose of the Christian propaganda, his Greek might have been halting and stilted, but it would not have been "colloquial." Dr. Streeter's English is quite as "colloquial" as Mark's Greek: but I do not infer that his native tongue is any other than that in which he is writing. Mark's Greek was "colloquial," I believe, exactly because he learnt it as a boy, neither from teachers nor from books, but from those with whom he mixed in daily and familiar intercourse. The sort of Hindustani an English boy picks up from the servants in the compound is something very different from the Hindustani his father or mother learns from a munshi. If the conjecture were correct (and there is much to be said for it) that Mark was the son of the οἰκοδεσπότης of Mark xiv. 14, it is quite certain, considering the number of Greek-speaking Jews who came up to Jerusalem, that an inn-keeper's staff and servants must have talked fluently enough some sort of Greek, however ungrammatical and unliterary that Greek might be. Is not this the genesis of the Greek of the Second Gospel?

A book like Dr. Streeter's offers a hundred points on which one might like to expound his views, to comment on them, and sometimes to criticize them. I have said nothing about his chapters on St. John, and little about his separate discussion of St. Matthew. But time and space alike forbid. I must rest content with having called attention to his book and its importance, and I have tried to keep some sort of balance in the selection respectively of things to commend and things where commendation is qualified. Since the qualifications have in self-defence to be set out at greater length than the mere statements of agreement, the measure of dissent may appear to be larger than it really is. Dr. Streeter has done something to roll away from Oxford and from the Faculty of Theology the reproach of failure to produce constructive work. His book is dedicated to one to whom he and I alike look back as friend and patron. No one would have given it a warmer welcome than William Sanday.

CUTHBERT H. TURNER.

REVIEW

THE PLACE OF REASON IN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC. By Leonard Hodgson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 5s.

The main argument of these excellent lectures is, perhaps, a little confused by a controversial side-issue. With Mr. Hodgson's insistence on the impossibility of escaping the necessity of justifying our faith at the bar of impartial reason no intelligent Christian, as I take it, can have any ground of quarrel. No one has any interest in defending a *fides* which is not a *fides quaerens intellectum*. And Mr. Hodgson deserves gratitude for the unusually clear and simple way in which he has brought into clear light a distinction too often forgotten, the distinction between the simple preacher of a religion and its apologist. It is quite true that the mission preacher may often be satisfied if he can only reproduce in his auditors the direct and immediate unquestioning faith he feels in himself, but the business of the apologist is not to communicate a faith, but to meet and dissolve critical objections against the reasonableness of the contents of it. But Mr. Hodgson has a second purpose which is not identical with this main purpose of indicating the lines on which apologetics should proceed. He wishes also to refute the position taken up by a reviewer of Dr. Gore in the *Church Times*. According to this reviewer, as summarized by Mr. Hodgson, the Christian faith has no need of any rational *apologia*, and this point has been established by Otto's now famous book, *The Idea of the Holy*. This leads Mr. Hodgson to devote a good half of his space to criticism of Otto.

Now there are here, obviously, several openings for misunderstanding. It is even possible, though a reviewer who has never seen the article in the *Church Times* cannot judge whether it is probable, that Mr. Hodgson's interpretation of that article would not be regarded by the writer as a correct one. It is still more possible that the writer in the *Church Times* may have understood so difficult a writer as Dr. Otto imperfectly. And it is possible, again, that Dr. Otto himself might agree with Mr. Hodgson that his own doctrine of the "numinous" is not a contribution to apologetics, while still holding that it is an important contribution to the "philosophy of religion." In trying to judge Mr. Hodgson's criticisms of Otto, I feel that one is beset by the double difficulty that they are primarily criticisms not so much of that author as of the use made of him by another person, and that they do not sufficiently distinguish between the truth of Otto's analysis of the "holy" and its possible value for apologetics.

There is still a further difficulty in connection with the chief

point: Mr. Hodgson is anxious to score against the *Idea of the Holy*. Admittedly, Dr. Otto holds that in the "numinous" we have a central core of religion which is, in some sense, "non-rational." Whether this view is tenable or not seems to depend wholly on the sense put on the term "non-rational," and I, for one, am not at all sure that Dr. Otto and Mr. Hodgson, to say nothing of the *Church Times* intervener in the argument, are all using that word in the same sense.

Mr. Hodgson suggests that Dr. Otto has made a confusion between two possible senses of the word—(*a*) the indefinable; (*b*) that which "produces not a concept, but an emotion," and that this confusion is likely to lead to dangerous errors. For his own part, he is willing to admit that religion, like art and morality, involves "indefinables," but denies that any of these indefinables are incapable of intellectual apprehension and revealed merely by emotion. The beautiful, the good, the true are all indefinable, but the intellect can get at them all; they can be understood; they are not names for something of which nothing can be said but that it evokes certain emotions. Further, he contends, the object of religious adoration, God, is apprehended as a synthesis of these three eminently intelligible values. God is truth, God is goodness, God is beauty. It remains yet to be determined whether in the notion of the "numinous" we have a fourth character of the divine, independent of these three or not. If we have, at least it is not irrational in the sense that thought cannot get at it.

On this last point I need hardly say that I agree wholly with Mr. Hodgson. I should suppose that Otto would agree with him too, since the whole of his book may fairly be said to be a sustained effort to bring the understanding to play upon the "numinous," and an attempt to show how, in proportion to the work of each religion, that religion apprehends the *numen* as an object of a "reasonable" worship. But I suspect that some injustice is unconsciously done to Otto by the alternative senses put on his expression about the non-rationality of the "numinous," though I could at once admit that I do not think Otto's own language does complete justice to what I believe to be his real meaning. Obviously by the "irrational" he cannot mean simply the "indefinable," since there are indefinables in all science; in respect of indefinability the "numinous" is on the same footing with the point or the straight line. No one can really define the straight line, but no one thinks this any reason for worshipping it. Again, Otto cannot well mean that the "numinous" is no more than the otherwise uncharacterized evoker of a certain emotional mood. If he really meant no more than this, there would be no reason for preferring a religion which worships the "Lord of Hosts" to one which worships a

crocodile or an odd-looking stone, since the emotion is there in all three cases. I suspect that what is really in Dr. Otto's mind would come out more clearly if one compared his use of the word " non-rational " with that of one of the acutest of living critics of the sciences, M. Émile Meyerson. M. Meyerson's fundamental thesis is that the whole of science itself pre-supposes the existence in nature of a " non-rational " factor which we are always trying to rationalize but can never wholly eliminate. Now it is quite clear what M. Meyerson means by this. He means that in any science you never feel that you have made object of your study completely rational until you have reduced it to something which " goes without saying," can be accepted by the intellect as self-luminous. A wholly rationalized science would be one which could " explain " everything from principles with a logical self-evidence, independently of any appeal to brute " given " fact. Hence the inspiration of Descartes, who hoped to reduce physics to geometry, and of Plato, who thought physics should be reduced to arithmetic. But Nature seems absolutely to refuse to be reduced to this transparency. The modern theorists of relativity, who might seem to have executed Descartes' programme, have only done so at the cost of replacing a geometry which seemed self-evident by one which is itself full of the merely " given " and " unexplained " (the " wrinkles in space " as they are called in the bad poetry of the modern newspaper). And, as M. Meyerson says, it is just this impossibility of clearing out of science an element of the " given " which, for all our intellect can see, might have been given quite differently, that accounts for the persistent conviction of the physicist that the objects he deals with are " realities," not creations of his own mind.

Now Otto seems to me to have much the same sense of the word " non-rational " at the back of his mind. I take his thought to be that *if* the object of worship could be simply analyzed without remainder into the true, the morally good, the beautiful, it might be argued that all these are highly rational ideals, and a doubt might arise whether the God we worship is more than an " externalization " of an ideal created by the mind of the worshipper. But, this is the thought, though it is a duty of religion itself to synthesize its primitive specific *datum* with these ideals, and to enrich it with their whole content, there is something else in the *datum*; there is its character of being the absolutely surprising and " other," and it is just this feature of it which stands most obstinately in the way of explaining away God as a " personification " of our own ideals.

I should have thought there could be little doubt about the reality of the facts to which Otto appeals. There are religions which genuinely worship what has neither beauty nor moral

goodness. At the other end of the scale, when we, as Christians, think of God as perfectly beautiful and perfectly good, we are still aware that this is not all we mean. God is this, but He is also the transcendently wonderful and amazing being whose " thoughts are not as our thoughts." It is one thing to believe that He is absolutely righteous in all His ways; it would be quite another to demand that His righteousness should be capable of being " demonstrated " to us. They are as " past finding out " and as mysterious as they are righteous, and, since it is part of what we mean by calling him God that even the most exalted of His creatures can never " comprehend " Him, the mystery will always be there. The more we see of His ways, the more righteous we find them, but also, the more plainly do we discover how little of His " way " we can see. God's action is always rational, and the more we learn of God, the more sure we are that this is so; we are constantly discovering what looks like beneficent purpose in what were, when they first befell us, apparently the worst inroads of unreason into the " course of events." But God's action will never be completely " rationalized " for us; we shall never " understand Him to the bottom." Eternity would be a dismal prospect if it did not promise an inexhaustible wealth of the " divine wonders " to delight us. This, I believe, is what Dr. Otto really means. You may see the same thing illustrated even by the work of the human artist.

In a sense, beauty is eminently rational. You can detect the skilful touches by which the beautiful result, the drama, the poem, the picture, the sonata has been built up, and it is the work of the intellect reflecting on these things of beauty to identify them. In a sense, all discovery of laws of form in æsthetics is the discovery of the rationality of beauty. But no criticism will ever enable men to say beforehand what particular trick of expression or stroke of the brush will produce the magical effect; one only knows *after* the effect has been produced. And there was no real ground for J. S. Mill's fear that, in time the production of a new musical beauty would become impossible, because all would already have been tried.

So again, I do not attach much weight to a consideration on which Mr. Hodgson seems to lay much stress, the absence from Dr. Otto's work of a hard-and-fast criterion between what is a real objective disclosure of the " numinous " and what is only falsely supposed to be so. I should say that the confusion between the two is no easier to make than the confusion between what is really good or beautiful and what is supposed to be good by persons with a corrupted morality or supposed to be beautiful by persons with a perverted taste. In none of these cases can you produce a simple criterion of universal applicability,

and it is a mistake to demand one. Virtuous men are the judges of real virtue, artists of real art. This may not be an infallible criterion, and it is certainly not one which can be reduced to any simple formula, but it is all we have. And so, I should say, the "true worshippers" are all the criterion we have of "true worship." Nor do I think it a serious objection to Dr. Otto's views to say that if he is right there may be persons incapable of religion, especially as his real view appears rather to be that the recognition of the "numinous" is a "power which all have, though few use it." I should have thought that about the same sort of case could be made out for the existence of some abnormal persons who have no apprehension of the distinction between good and bad or between beauty and ugliness. Whether there are or are not men "incapable of religion" seems to me a question beyond our power to determine. At least, we may say that all that we could ever prove is that there are men whose capacity for it seems never to be awakened by their present experiences. If there are any absolute "incapables" (and there is no reason why agreement with Dr. Otto about the specific character of the "numinous" should prejudice this question), their destiny is in the hands of their Maker, and it pertains to Him, not to us, to judge them. And, in any case, it is at least certain that spiritual gifts are not bestowed on all men equally; some receive ten talents, others one, as the Master of the talents sees fit.

At the same time, it is clear that Dr. Otto's work may possibly suggest to some readers, as Mr. Hodgson says it did to the *Church Times* reviewer, dangerous inferences which Dr. Otto may be far from having intended, and Mr. Hodgson's comments are eminently worthy of study as a warning against these inferences. On one point, I own, I wish he had spoken differently, and I suspect that his language hardly does justice to his meaning. More than once he speaks as though the business of apologetics is to show that "the universe" has the characters of personality and righteousness which justify us in calling "it" God. I can hardly believe that Mr. Hodgson seriously means that a true religion must personify and worship the "universe." Christians, at least, have always supposed that their worship is paid not to the "universe" of the creatures, but to the Maker who absolutely transcends all His creatures; I myself see no adequate reason for believing either that there is such a determinate object as "*the* universe," or that if there is, it is a person at all. If Mr. Hodgson were to be judged by the letter of what he says, I should regard this concession to materialistic Pantheism as much more dangerous to religion than any of the unguarded expressions he warns us against in Dr. Otto.

I much regret that the length at which I have written prevents me from adding any comments on the last section of the

book, the sane and attractive address on *Experience, Religious Experience, and Christian Experience*, beyond a mere expression of absolute agreement with the protest against giving to the experience the primary place which belongs by right to the object experienced.

A. E. TAYLOR.

NOTICE

ANGLICAN CHURCH PRINCIPLES. By F. J. Foakes-Jackson. Macmillan and Co. 10s. 6d.

Statements of the Anglican position, from different points of view; have been frequent lately. We have had the Bishop of Durham's Upsala Lectures, the Bishop of Gloucester's Primary Charge, and the Rev. Wilfred Knox's book on the Catholic Movement. Dr. Foakes-Jackson's statement takes the form of a short history of the English Church from the earliest times, written to show her continuity and her national character. The history is admirably written, and is, on the whole, fair to all parties: but there are in it signs of hasty writing. It is difficult to see for what public this book is intended. It is too expensive for a popular handbook: but there is little in it that is not well known to students of Church History: nor is there anything very original in Dr. Foakes-Jackson's defence of Anglicanism. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that it was published in America. If, as we suppose, the author's purpose is to show Americans what the Anglican Church stands for, it is a pity that he has marred his work by inserting a number of disputable statements on various subjects, the omission of which would not have seriously affected his thesis. Thus, on p. 16, he asserts that the post-Reformation Anglican Church could not assent to the decree of the Second Council of Nicæa on images, and that Gregory the Great's attitude was "not dissimilar"! But the English Church has never repudiated this Council, though she has rejected the exaggerated cultus of the later Western Church: the universal respect paid to our innumerable war-memorials in the form of crucifixes could not be connected by anyone but a fanatical Puritan with the "doctrina Romanensium," condemned in the Twenty-second Article. On p. 122 he implies that prayers for the dead were prohibited under the Elizabethan Settlement. But Andrewes, Ken, Thorndike, and many other post-Reformation divines practised them, and Cosin tells us that the words "we and all Thy whole Church" were expressly intended by the Revisers of 1662 to include the dead. On pp. 125-6 we are told that the Church "lost the support of the nation" by identifying herself with the cause of King Charles I. But the great mass of the people was for the Church and the King all through, and did not understand government which was not personal. The wealth of London, the generalship of Cromwell, and the enthusiasm of the New Model carried the Puritans to victory: but they never possessed the confidence of the majority of the nation. The King might have compromised on the political issue: it was because he would not betray the Church that he lost his throne and his life. Again, Dr. Foakes-Jackson tells us, on p. 137, that under the Restoration, "Scotland was compelled, against the will of the people, to endure the Bishops." This is only true of parts of the Lowlands. Dr. Pullan (*Religion Since the Reformation*, p. 150) shows that in the whole country "Episcopals" were in the majority. Not a single delegate from

the North attended the Presbyterian General Assembly of 1690. "From Aberdeenshire to Ardnamurchan, as a rule, Episcopacy was supreme." Dr. Foakes-Jackson has been misled by the Whig tradition.

Similarly, we think, he has underrated the effects of the Reformation, of which he takes the traditional Anglican view. Before the death of Henry VIII there had already been vast spoliation of Church property. The suppression of the cultus of saints, whether justifiable or not, must have been a terrible loss to the spiritual life of the people, if popular devotion was as much directed towards the denizens of the court of Heaven as it is both in Latin and Eastern countries to-day. On p. 78 we are told that under Edward VI the country was "seething with rebellion and discontent": on p. 86, that the "ancient worship was abolished without any serious disturbances." It was Devonshire, as well as Cornwall, that called the Prayer-Book of 1549 a "Christmas game" (p. 79): Dr. Foakes-Jackson's suggestion that the rebels "did not speak English" requires justification.

Dr. Foakes-Jackson exaggerates, we think, the effect of Darwinism on religion, attributing to it much which is due to other causes. He implies, without actually asserting, the old calumny that Colenso was deprived of his see only for denying that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. In reality, he was condemned on nine charges, of which the chief were his denial of the Atonement, of Baptismal Regeneration, and of Eternal Punishment.

Nor has Dr. Foakes-Jackson laid sufficient emphasis on the Erastian issue which lay behind the Colenso controversy and the persecution of the Ritualists. He lays his finger on a weak spot when he tells us (p. 206) that the religion which ignores Eternal Punishment becomes "not only amiable but anæmic." No possible scientific discovery can alter the revealed truth that

> "Soon we must through darkness go
> To inherit bliss unending
> Or eternity of woe."

The short chapter on "The Expansion of the Anglican Church," with a map of the world, is admirably done. The author thinks that "a reunion of all English-speaking peoples and those of kindred race in one communion is most to be desired" (p. 196): but such a reunion would still fall far short of St. Paul's conception of the Christian Church as the bond of union for all nations. Our growing friendship with the Eastern Churches is not mentioned.

The book contains a number of verbal slips, such as the use of "Sabbath" for the Lord's Day on p. 63: the references to the Recusants under Elizabeth as "Catholics," which is contrary to the whole thesis of the author that the English Church is continuous from the earliest times: and the implication on p. 179 that the National Society was founded by the Evangelicals, and not by their opponents, the "Clapton Phalanx." In several places the author seems uncertain about the difference between a cope and a chasuble. The warning against the Roman claims on pp. 196-7 should be carefully noted, especially as Roman tendencies in some Anglican quarters are causing grave anxiety to our friends in the East.

Though we have felt bound to criticize some of Dr. Foakes-Jackson's details, we are grateful to him for an exceedingly able and well written defence of the historic Anglican position: and we only wish that the price of his book was low enough to bring it within reach of those who would profit by it most.

C. B. Moss.

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